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3 Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report 
Summary
There are many potential threats to our democracy and our values. One such threat arises 
from what has been coined ‘fake news’, created for profit or other gain, disseminated 
through state-sponsored programmes, or spread through the deliberate distortion of 
facts, by groups with a particular agenda, including the desire to affect political elections.
Such has been the impact of this agenda, the focus of our inquiry moved from 
understanding the phenomenon of ‘fake news’, distributed largely through social 
media, to issues concerning the very future of democracy. Arguably, more invasive than 
obviously false information is the relentless targeting of hyper-partisan views, which 
play to the fears and prejudices of people, in order to influence their voting plans and 
their behaviour. We are faced with a crisis concerning the use of data, the manipulation 
of our data, and the targeting of pernicious views. In particular, we heard evidence of 
Russian state-sponsored attempts to influence elections in the US and the UK through 
social media, of the efforts of private companies to do the same, and of law-breaking by 
certain Leave campaign groups in the UK’s EU Referendum in their use of social media.
In this rapidly changing digital world, our existing legal framework is no longer fit for 
purpose. This is very much an interim Report, following an extensive inquiry. A further, 
substantive Report will follow in the autumn of 2018. We have highlighted significant 
concerns, following recent revelations regarding, in particular, political manipulation 
and set we out areas where urgent action needs to be taken by the Government and other 
regulatory agencies to build resilience against misinformation and disinformation into 
our democratic system. Our democracy is at risk, and now is the time to act, to protect 
our shared values and the integrity of our democratic institutions.
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1 Introduction and background
1. In this inquiry, we have studied the spread of false, misleading, and persuasive 
content, and the ways in which malign players, whether automated or human, or both 
together, distort what is true in order to create influence, to intimidate, to make money, or 
to influence political elections.
2. People are increasingly finding out about what is happening in this country, in their 
local communities, and across the wider world, through social media, rather than through 
more traditional forms of communication, such as television, print media, or the radio.1 
Social media has become hugely influential in our lives.2 Research by the Reuters Institute 
for the Study of Journalism has shown that not only are huge numbers of people accessing 
news and information worldwide through Facebook, in particular, but also through social 
messaging software such as WhatsApp. When such media are used to spread rumours 
and ‘fake news’, the consequences can be devastating.3
3. Tristan Harris, Co-founder and Executive Director, at the Center for Humane 
Technology—an organisation seeking to realign technology with the best interests of its 
users—told us about the many billions of people who interact with social media: “There are 
more than 2 billion people who use Facebook, which is about the number of conventional 
followers of Christianity. There are about 1.8 billion users of YouTube, which is about the 
number of conventional followers of Islam. People check their phones about 150 times a 
day in the developed world.”4 This equates to once every 6.4 minutes in a 16-hour day. This 
is a profound change in the way in which we access information and news, one which has 
occurred without conscious appreciation by most of us.
4. This kind of evidence led us to explore the use of data analytics and psychological 
profiling to target people on social media with political content, as its political impact 
has been profound, but largely unappreciated. The inquiry was launched in January 2017 
in the previous Parliament, and then relaunched in the autumn, following the June 2017 
election. The inquiry’s Terms of Reference were as follows:
• What is ‘fake news’? Where does biased but legitimate commentary shade into 
propaganda and lies?
• What impact has fake news on public understanding of the world, and also on 
the public response to traditional journalism? If all views are equally valid, does 
objectivity and balance lose all value?
• Is there any difference in the way people of different ages, social backgrounds, 
genders etc use and respond to fake news?
• Have changes in the selling and placing of advertising encouraged the growth of 
fake news, for example by making it profitable to use fake news to attract more 
hits to websites, and thus more income from advertisers?5
1 News consumption in the UK: 2016, Ofcom, 29 June 2017
2 Tristan Harris, Co-founder and Executive Director, Center for Humane Technology, Q3147
3 The seventh annual Digital News Report, by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of 
Oxford was based on a YouGov online survey of 74,000 people in 37 countries.
4 Tristan Harris, Q3147
5 Terms of reference, Fake News inquiry, DCMS Committee, 15 September 2017.
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5. We will address the wider areas of our Terms of Reference, including the role of 
advertising, in our further Report this autumn. In recent months, however, our inquiry 
delved increasingly into the political use of social media, raising concerns that we wish 
to address immediately. We had asked representatives from Facebook, in February 2018, 
about Facebook developers and data harvesting.6 Then, in March 2018, Carole Cadwalladr 
of The Observer,7 together with Channel 4 News, and the New York Times, published 
allegations about Cambridge Analytica (and associated companies) and its work with 
Global Science Research (GSR), and the misuse of Facebook data.8 Those allegations 
put into question the use of data during the EU Referendum in 2016, and the extent of 
foreign interference in UK politics. Our oral evidence sessions subsequently focussed on 
those specific revelations, and we invited several people involved to give evidence. The 
allegations highlighted both the amount of data that private companies and organisations 
hold on individuals, and the ability of technology to manipulate people.
6. This transatlantic media coverage brought our Committee into close contact with 
other parliaments around the world. The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the European 
Parliament, and the Canadian Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy, 
and Ethics all carried out independent investigations. We shared information, sometimes 
live, during the hearings. Representatives from other countries, including Spain, France, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Australia, Singapore, Canada, and Uzbekistan, have visited 
London, and we have shared our evidence and thoughts. We were also told about the 
work of SCL Elections—and other SCL associates, including Cambridge Analytica—set 
up by the businessman Alexander Nix; their role in manipulating foreign elections; and 
the financial benefits they gained through those activities. What became clear is that, 
without the knowledge of most politicians and election regulators across the world, 
not to mention the wider public, a small group of individuals and businesses had been 
influencing elections across different jurisdictions in recent years.
7. We invited many witnesses to give evidence. Some came to the Committee willingly, 
others less so. We were forced to summon two witnesses: Alexander Nix, former CEO of 
Cambridge Analytica; and Dominic Cummings, Campaign Director of Vote Leave, the 
designated Leave campaign group in the EU Referendum. While Mr. Nix subsequently 
agreed to appear before the Committee, Dominic Cummings still refused. We were then 
compelled to ask the House to support a motion ordering Mr Cummings to appear before 
the Committee.9 At the time of writing he has still not complied with this Order, and the 
matter has been referred by the House to the Committee of Privileges. Mr Cummings’ 
contemptuous behaviour is unprecedented in the history of this Committee’s inquiries and 
underlines concerns about the difficulties of enforcing co-operation with Parliamentary 
scrutiny in the modern age. We will return to this issue in our Report in the autumn, and 
believe it to be an urgent matter for consideration by the Privileges Committee and by 
Parliament as a whole.
6 Monika Bickert, Q389
7 In June 2018, Carole Cadwalladr won the Orwell journalism prize, for her investigative work into Cambridge 
Analytica, which culminated in a series of articles from March 2018.
8 Harry Davies had previously published the following article Ted Cruz using firm that harvested data on millions 
of unwitting Facebook users, in The Guardian, on 11 December 2015, which first revealed the harvesting of data 
from Facebook.
9 Following the motion being passed, Dominic Cummings did not appear before the Committee. The matter was 
then referred to the Privileges Committee on 28 June 2018.
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8. In total, we held twenty oral evidence sessions, including two informal background 
sessions, and heard from 61 witnesses, asking over 3,500 questions at these hearings. We 
received over 150 written submissions, numerous pieces of background evidence, and 
undertook substantial exchanges of correspondence with organisations and individuals. 
We held one oral evidence session in Washington D.C. (the first time a Select Committee 
has held a public, live broadcast oral evidence session abroad) and also heard from 
experts in the tech field, journalists and politicians, in private meetings, in Washington 
and New York. Most of our witnesses took the Select Committee process seriously, and 
gave considered, thoughtful evidence, specific to the context of our inquiry. We thank 
witnesses, experts, politicians, and individuals (including whistle-blowers) whom we met 
in public and in private, in this country and abroad, and who have been generous with 
their expertise, knowledge, help and ideas.10 We also thank Dr Lara Brown and her team 
at the Graduate School of Political Management at George Washington University, for 
hosting the Select Committee’s oral evidence session in the US.
9. As noted above, this is our first Report on misinformation and disinformation. 
Another Report will be published in the autumn of 2018, which will include more 
substantive recommendations, and also detailed analysis of data obtained from the 
insecure AggregateIQ website, harvested and submitted to us by Chris Vickery, Director 
of Cyber Risk Research at UpGuard.11 Aggregate IQ is one of the businesses involved most 
closely in influencing elections.
10. Since we commenced this inquiry, the Electoral Commission has reported on serious 
breaches by Vote Leave and other campaign groups during the 2016 EU Referendum; 
the Information Commissioner’s Office has found serious data breaches by Facebook 
and Cambridge Analytica, amongst others; the Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport (DDCMS) has launched the Cairncross Review into press sustainability in the 
digital age; and, following a Green Paper in May, 2018, the Government has announced 
its intention to publish a White Paper later this year into making the internet and social 
media safer. This interim Report, therefore, focuses at this stage on seven of the areas 
covered in our inquiry:
• Definition of fake news, and how to spot it;
• Definition, role and legal liabilities of social media platforms;
• Data misuse and targeting, focussing on the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica/
AIQ revelations;
• Political campaigning;
• Foreign players in UK elections and referenda;
• Co-ordination of Departments within Government;
• Digital literacy.
10 Our expert adviser for the inquiry was Dr Charles Kriel, Associate Fellow at the King’s Centre for Strategic 
Communications (KCSC), King’s College London. His Declaration of Interests are: Director, Kriel.Agency, a digital 
media and social data consulting agency; Countering Violent Extremism Programme Director, Corsham Institute, 
a civil society charity; and Cofounder and shareholder, Lightful, a social media tool for charities.
11 In the early autumn, we hope to invite Ofcom and the Advertising Standards Authority to give evidence, and 
to re-invite witnesses from the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Electoral Commission, and this oral 
evidence will also inform our substantive Report.
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Definition of ‘fake news’
11. There is no agreed definition of the term ‘fake news’, which became widely used in 
2016 (although it first appeared in the US in the latter part of the 19th century).12 Claire 
Wardle, from First Draft, told us in our oral evidence session in Washington D.C. that 
“when we are talking about this huge spectrum, we cannot start thinking about regulation, 
and we cannot start talking about interventions, if we are not clear about what we mean”.13 
It has been used by some, notably the current US President Donald Trump, to describe 
content published by established news providers that they dislike or disagree with, but is 
more widely applied to various types of false information, including:
• Fabricated content: completely false content;
• Manipulated content: distortion of genuine information or imagery, for example 
a headline that is made more sensationalist, often popularised by ‘clickbait’;
• Imposter content: impersonation of genuine sources, for example by using the 
branding of an established news agency;
• Misleading content: misleading use of information, for example by presenting 
comment as fact;
• False context of connection: factually accurate content that is shared with false 
contextual information, for example when a headline of an article does not 
reflect the content;
• Satire and parody: presenting humorous but false stores as if they are true. 
Although not usually categorised as fake news, this may unintentionally fool 
readers.14
12. In addition to the above is the relentless prevalence of ‘micro-targeted messaging’, 
which may distort people’s views and opinions.15 The distortion of images is a related 
problem; evidence from MoneySavingExpert.com cited celebrities who have had their 
images used to endorse scam money-making businesses, including Martin Lewis, whose 
face has been used in adverts across Facebook and the internet for scams endorsing 
products including binary trading and energy products.16 There are also ‘deepfakes’, audio 
and videos that look and sound like a real person, saying something that that person has 
never said.17 These examples will only become more complex and harder to spot, the more 
sophisticated the software becomes.
13. There is no regulatory body that oversees social media platforms and written 
content including printed news content, online, as a whole. However, in the UK, under 
the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom sets and enforces content standards for television 
12 Fake News: A Roadmap, NATO Strategic Centre for Strategic Communications, Riga and King’s Centre for 
Strategic Communications (KCSE), January 2018.
13 Claire Wardle, Q573
14 Online information and fake news, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, July 2017, box 4. 
Also see First Draft News, Fake news. It’s complicated, February 2017; Ben Nimmo (FNW0125); Full Fact, 
(FNW0097)
15 Micro-targeting of messages will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.
16 MoneySavingExpert.com (FKN0068)
17 Edward Lucas, Q881
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and radio broadcasters, including rules relating to accuracy and impartiality.18 On 13 
July 2018, Ofcom’s Chief Executive, Sharon White, called for greater regulation of social 
media, and announced plans to release an outline of how such regulation could work in 
the autumn of this year.19 We shall assess these plans in our further Report.
14. The term ‘fake news’ is bandied around with no clear idea of what it means, or 
agreed definition. The term has taken on a variety of meanings, including a description 
of any statement that is not liked or agreed with by the reader. We recommend that the 
Government rejects the term ‘fake news’, and instead puts forward an agreed definition 
of the words ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’. With such a shared definition, and 
clear guidelines for companies, organisations, and the Government to follow, there will 
be a shared consistency of meaning across the platforms, which can be used as the basis 
of regulation and enforcement.
15. We recommend that the Government uses the rules given to Ofcom under the 
Communications Act 2003 to set and enforce content standards for television and 
radio broadcasters, including rules relating to accuracy and impartiality, as a basis 
for setting standards for online content. We look forward to hearing Ofcom’s plans for 
greater regulation of social media this autumn. We plan to comment on these in our 
further Report.
How to spot ‘fake news’
16. Standards surrounding fact-checking exist, through the International Fact-
Checking Network’s Code of Principles, signed by the majority of major fact-checkers.20 
A recent report of the independent High-Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online 
Disinformation highlighted that, while a Code of Principles exists, fact-checkers themselves 
must continually improve on their own transparency.21
17. Algorithms are being used to help address the challenges of misinformation. We 
heard evidence from Professor Kalina Bontcheva, who conceived and led the Pheme 
research project, which aims to create a system to automatically verify online rumours 
and thereby allow journalists, governments and others to check the veracity of stories 
on social media.22 Algorithms are also being developed to help to identify fake news. 
The fact-checking organisation, Full Fact, received funding from Google to develop an 
automated fact-checking tool for journalists.23 Facebook and Google have also altered 
their algorithms so that content identified as misinformation ranks lower.24 Many 
organisations are exploring ways in which content on the internet can be verified, kite-
marked, and graded according to agreed definitions.25
18. The Government should support research into the methods by which misinformation 
and disinformation are created and spread across the internet: a core part of this is fact-
18 Ofcom (FNW0107)
19 ‘It’s time to regulate social media sites that publish news’ The Times 13 July 2018
20 The International Fact-Checking Network website, accessed 21 June 2018.
21 A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, Report of the independent High Level Expert Group on Fake 
News and Online Disinformation, March 2018.
22 Pheme website, www.pheme.eu, accessed 21 June 2018
23 Full Fact website, fullfact.org, accessed 21 June 2018
24 Mosseri, Facebook, “Working to stop misinformation and false news”. 6/4/2017
25 Full Fact (FNW0097); Disinformation Index (FKN0058); HonestReporting (FKN0047); Factmata Limited, UK 
(FKN0035).
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checking. We recommend that the Government initiate a working group of experts to 
create a credible annotation of standards, so that people can see, at a glance, the level 
of verification of a site. This would help people to decide on the level of importance that 
they put on those sites.
Our recommendations in this Report
19. During the course of this inquiry we have wrestled with complex, global issues, 
which cannot easily be tackled by blunt, reactive and outmoded legislative instruments. 
In this Report, we suggest principle-based recommendations which are sufficiently 
adaptive to deal with fast-moving technological developments. We look forward to 
hearing the Government’s response to these recommendations.
20. We also welcome submissions to the Committee from readers of this interim Report, 
based on these recommendations, and on specific areas where the recommendations 
can incorporate work already undertaken by others. This inquiry has grown through 
collaboration with other countries, organisations, parliamentarians, and individuals, 
in this country and abroad, and we want this co-operation to continue.
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2 The definition, role and legal 
responsibilities of tech companies
21. At the centre of the argument about misinformation and disinformation is the role of 
tech companies, on whose platforms content is disseminated.26 Throughout the chapter, 
we shall use the term ‘tech companies’ to indicate the different types of social media and 
internet service providers, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google. It is important to note 
that a series of mergers and acquisitions mean that a handful of tech companies own the 
major platforms. For example, Facebook owns Instagram and WhatsApp; Alphabet owns 
both Google and YouTube.
22. The word ‘platform’ suggests that these companies act in a passive way, posting 
information they receive, and not themselves influencing what we see, or what we do not 
see. However, this is a misleading term; tech companies do control what we see, by their 
very business model. They want to engage us from the moment we log onto their sites and 
into their apps, in order to generate revenue from the adverts that we see. In this chapter, 
we will explore: the definitions surrounding tech companies; the companies’ power in 
choosing and disseminating content to users; and the role of the Government and the 
tech companies themselves in ensuring that those companies carry out their business in 
a transparent, accountable way.
An unregulated sphere
23. Tristan Harris of the Center for Humane Technology27 provided a persuasive 
narrative of the development and role of social media platforms, telling us that engagement 
of the user is an integral part both of tech companies’ business model and of their growth 
strategy:
They set the dial; they don’t want to admit that they set the dial, and instead 
they keep claiming, “We’re a neutral platform,” or, “We’re a neutral tool,” but 
in fact every choice they make is a choice architecture. They are designing 
how compelling the thing that shows up next on the news feed is, and their 
admission that they can already change the news feeds so that people spend 
less time [on it] shows that they do have control of that.28
24. Mr Harris told us that, while we think that we are in control of what we look at when 
we check our phones (on average, around 150 times a day), our mind is being hijacked, as 
if we were playing a slot machine:
Every time you scroll, you might as well be playing a slot machine, because 
you are not sure what is going to come up next on the page. A slot machine 
is a very simple, powerful technique that causes people to want to check in 
all the time. Facebook and Twitter, by being social products—by using your 
26 As of February 2018, 79% of the UK population had Facebook accounts, 79% used YouTube, and 47% used 
Twitter, https://weareflint.co.uk/press-release-social-media-demographics-2018
27 The Center for Humane Technology website, accessed 27 June 2018
28 Tristan Harris, Q3149
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social network—have an infinite supply of new information that they could 
show you. There are literally thousands of things that they could populate 
that news feed with, which turns it into that random-reward slot machine.29
25. Coupled with this is the relentless feed of information that we receive on our phones, 
which is driven by tech engineers “who know a lot more about how your mind works than 
you do. They play all these different tricks every single day and update those tricks to keep 
people hooked”.30
Regulatory architecture
The Information Commissioner’s Office
26. The Information Commissioner is a non-departmental public body, with statutory 
responsibility “for regulating the processing of personal data” in the United Kingdom,31 
including the enforcement of the new Data Protection Act 2018 and the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).32 The ICO’s written evidence describes the Commission’s 
role as “one of the sheriffs of the internet”.33
27. The Commissioner, Elizabeth Denham, highlighted the “behind the scenes 
algorithms, analysis, data matching and profiling” which mean that people’s data is being 
used in new ways to target them with information.34 She sees her role as showing the public 
how personal data is collected, used and shared through advertising and through the 
micro-targeting of messages delivered through social media.”35 She has a range of powers 
to ensure that personal data is processed within the legislative framework, including the 
serving of an information notice, requiring specified information to be provided within a 
defined timeframe.
28. The 2018 Act extends the Commissioner’s powers to conduct a full audit where 
she suspects that data protection legislation has, or is being, contravened and to order 
a company to stop processing data. Elizabeth Denham told us that these would be 
“powerful” measures.36 The recent legislative changes also increased the maximum fine 
that the Commissioner can levy, from £500,000 to £17 million or 4% of global turnover, 
whichever is greater, and set out her responsibilities for international co-operation on the 
enforcement of data protection legislation.37
29. The Data Protection Act 2018 created a new definition, called “Applied GDPR”, to 
describe an amended version of the GDPR, when European Union law does not apply 
(when the UK leaves the EU). Data controllers would still need to assess whether they are 
subject to EU law, in order to decide whether to follow the GDPR or the Applied GDPR. 
29 Q3147
30 Tristan Harris, Q3147
31 Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner (FKN0051)
32 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into force on 25 May 2018 and is a regulation under 
EU law on data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union (EU) and the European 
Economic Area (EEA). It forms part of the data protection regime in the UK, together with the new Data 
Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018).
33 Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner (FKN0051)
34 Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner (FKN0051)
35 Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner (FKN0051)
36 Q907
37 Guide to the GDPR, ICO website, accessed 21 July 2018
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Apart from the exceptions laid down in the GDPR, all personal data processed in the 
United Kingdom comes within the scope of European Union law, until EU law no longer 
applies to the United Kingdom. However, when the United Kingdom leaves the EU, social 
media companies could “process personal data of people in the UK from bases in the 
US without any coverage of data protection law. Organisations that emulate Cambridge 
Analytica could set up in offshore locations and profile individuals in the UK without 
being subject to any rules on processing personal data”, according to Robert Madge, CEO 
of the Swiss data management company Xifrat Daten.38
30. The Data Protection Act 2018 gives greater protection to people’s data than did 
its predecessor, the 1998 Data Protection Act, and follows the law set out in the GDPR. 
However, when the UK leaves the EU, social media companies will be able to process 
personal data of people in the UK from bases in the US, without any coverage of data 
protection law. We urge the Government to clarify this loophole in a White Paper this 
autumn.
Investigation into the use of data analytics for political purposes
31. In May 2017, the ICO announced a formal investigation into the use of data analytics 
for political purposes. The investigation has two strands: explaining how personal data 
is used in the context of political messaging; and taking enforcement action against 
any found breaches of data protection legislation.39 The investigation has involved 30 
organisations, including Facebook and Cambridge Analytica. Elizabeth Denham said of 
the investigation:
For the public, we need to be able to understand why an individual sees a 
certain ad. Why does an individual see a message in their newsfeed that 
somebody else does not see? We are really the data cops here. We are doing 
a data audit to be able to understand and to pull back the curtain on the 
advertising model around political campaigning and elections.40
32. In response to our request for the ICO to provide an update on the investigation into 
data analytics in political campaigning, the Commissioner duly published this update on 
11 July 2018.41 We are grateful to the Commissioner for providing such a useful, detailed 
update on her investigations, and we look forward to receiving her final report in due 
course.
33. The ICO has been given extra responsibilities, but with those responsibilities should 
come extra resources. Christopher Wylie, a whistle-blower and ex-SCL employee, has had 
regular contact with the ICO, and he explained that the organisation has limited resources 
to deal with its responsibilities: “A lot of the investigators do not have a robust technical 
background. […] They are in charge of regulating data, which means that they should 
have a lot of people who understand how databases work”.42
34. Paul-Olivier Dehaye, founder of PersonalDataIO, told us that he had sent a letter to the 
ICO in August 2016, asking them if they were investigating Cambridge Analytica, because 
38 Brexit risk to UK personal data, Robert Madge, Medium, 22 June 2018
39 Q895
40 Q899
41 Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: investigation update, ICO, July 2018.
42 Q1460
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of the information about the company that was publicly available at that time. He told us 
that “if the right of access was made much more efficient, because of increased staffing at 
the ICO, this right would be adopted by [...] educators, journalists, activists, academics, as 
a tool to connect civil society with the commercial world and to help document what is 
happening”.43 Data scientists at the ICO need to be able to cope with new technologies that 
are not even in existence at the moment and, therefore, the ICO needs to be as technically 
expert, if not more so, than the experts in private tech companies.
35. The Commissioner told us that the Government had given the ICO pay flexibility 
to retain and recruit more expert staff: “We need forensic investigators, we need senior 
counsel and lawyers, we need access to the best, and maybe outside counsel, to be able to 
help us with some of these really big files”.44 We are unconvinced that pay flexibility will 
be enough to retain and recruit technical experts.
36. We welcome the increased powers that the Information Commissioner has been 
given as a result of the Data Protection Act 2018, and the ability to be able to look behind 
the curtain of tech companies, and to examine the data for themselves. However, to be 
a sheriff in the wild west of the internet, which is how the Information Commissioner 
has described her office, the ICO needs to have the same if not more technical expert 
knowledge as those organisations under scrutiny. The ICO needs to attract and employ 
more technically-skilled engineers who not only can analyse current technologies, but 
have the capacity to predict future technologies. We acknowledge the fact that the 
Government has given the ICO pay flexibility to retain and recruit more expert staff, but 
it is uncertain whether pay flexibility will be enough to retain and attract the expertise 
that the ICO needs. We recommend that the White Paper explores the possibility of 
major investment in the ICO and the way in which that money should be raised. One 
possible route could be a levy on tech companies operating in the UK, to help pay for the 
expanded work of the ICO, in a similar vein to the way in which the banking sector pays 
for the upkeep of the Financial Conduct Authority.
The Electoral Commission
37. The Electoral Commission is responsible for regulating and enforcing the rules 
that govern political campaign finance in the UK. Their priority is to ensure appropriate 
transparency and voter confidence in the system.45 However, concerns have been expressed 
about the relevance of that legislation in an age of social media and online campaigning. 
Claire Bassett, the Electoral Commission’s Chief Executive, told us that, “It is no great 
secret that our electoral law is old and fragmented. It has developed over the years, and we 
struggle with the complexity created by that, right across the work that we do.”46
38. The use of social media in political campaigning has had major consequences for 
the Electoral Commission’s work.47 As a financial regulator, the Electoral Commission 
regulates “by looking at how campaigners and parties receive income, and how they 
spend that.”48 While that is primarily achieved through the spending returns submitted 
43 Q1460
44 Q923
45 Electoral Commission (FNW0048)
46 Q2617
47 The Electoral Commission’s remit covers the UK only and it has no power to intervene or to stop someone acting 
if they are outside the UK (Claire Bassett, Q2655)
48 Q2617
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by registered campaigners, the Commission also conducts real-time monitoring of 
campaign activities, including on social media, that it can then compare the facts with 
what it is being told.49 Where the Electoral Commission suspects or identifies that rules 
have been breached it has the power to conduct investigations, refer matters to the police, 
and issue sanctions, including fines.
39. At present, campaign spending is declared under broad categories such as ‘advertising’ 
and ‘unsolicited material to electors’, with no specific category for digital campaigning, 
not to mention the many subcategories covered by paid and organic campaigning, and 
combinations thereof. Bob Posner, the Electoral Commission’s Director of Political 
Finance and Regulation and Legal Counsel, told us that “A more detailed category of 
spending would be helpful to understand what is spent on services, advertising, leaflets, 
posters or whatever it might be, so anyone can interrogate and question it.”50 The Electoral 
Commission has since recommended that legislation be amended so that spending returns 
clearly detail digital campaigning.51
40. Spending on election or referendum campaigns by foreign organisations or 
individuals is not allowed. We shall be exploring issues surrounding the donation to Leave.
EU by Arron Banks in Chapter 4, but another example involving Cambridge Analytica 
was brought to our attention by Arron Banks himself. A document from Cambridge 
Analytica’s presentation pitch to Leave.EU stated that “We will co-ordinate a programme 
of targeted solicitation, using digital advertising and other media as appropriate to raise 
funds for Leave.EU in the UK, the USA, and in other countries.”52 In response to a question 
asking whether he had taken legal advice on this proposal, Alexander Nix, the then CEO 
of Cambridge Analytica, replied, “We took a considerable amount of legal advice and, 
at the time, it was suggested by our counsel that we could target British nationals living 
abroad for donations. I believe […] that there is still some lack of clarity about whether 
this is true or not.53
41. When giving evidence, the Electoral Commission repeated a recommendation first 
made in 2003 that online campaign material should legally be required to carry a digital 
imprint, identifying the source. While the Electoral Commission’s remit does not cover 
the content of campaign material, and it is “not in a position to monitor the truthfulness 
of campaign claims, online or otherwise”, it holds that digital imprints “will help voters 
to assess the credibility of campaign messages.”54 A recent paper from Upturn, Leveling 
the platform: real transparency for paid messages on Facebook, highlighted the fact that 
“ads can be shared widely, and live beyond indication that their distribution was once 
subsidized. And they can be targeted with remarkable precision”.55 For this reason, we 
believe digital imprints should be clear and make it easy for users to identify what is in 
adverts and who the advertiser is.
49 Q2717
50 Q2668
51 Digital campaigning: increasing transparency for voters, Electoral Commission, 25 June 2018, p12
52 Arron Banks (FKN0056)
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54 Digital campaigning: increasing transparency for voters, Electoral Commission, 25 June 2018, p9
55 Levelling the platform: real transparency for paid messages on Facebook, Upturn, May 2018
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42. The Electoral Commission published a report on 26 June 2018, calling for the law to 
be strengthened around digital advertising and campaigning, including:
• A change in the law to require all digital political campaign material to state 
who paid for it, bringing online adverts in line with physical leaflets and adverts;
• New legislation to make it clear that spending in UK elections and referenda by 
foreign organisations and individuals is not allowed;
• An increase in the maximum fine, currently £20,000 per offence, that the 
Electoral Commission can impose on organisations and individuals who break 
the rules;
• Tougher requirements for political campaigns to declare their spending soon 
after or during a campaign, rather than months later;
• A requirement for all campaigners to provide more detailed paperwork on how 
they spent money online.56
43. Claire Bassett told us that the current maximum fine that the Electoral Commission 
can impose on wrongdoings in political campaigning is £20,000, which she said is described 
as “the cost of doing business” for some individuals and organisations. Ms Bassett said 
that this amount was too low and should be increased, in line with other regulators that 
can impose more significant fines.57 She also commented on how she would like a change 
to the regulated periods, particularly in reference to referenda:
One of the challenges we have as regulator is that we are a financial 
regulator, and we regulate the parties and campaigners, usually during just 
that regulated period or the extended period that is set out. That does create 
challenges in a referendum setting. We think there is value in looking at 
those campaign regulated periods and thinking about how they work.58
We are aware that the Report of the Independent Commission on Referendums made 
similar recommendations in its report of July 2018.59
44. The globalised nature of social media creates challenges for regulators. In evidence 
Facebook did not accept their responsibilities to identify or prevent illegal election 
campaign activity from overseas jurisdictions. In the context of outside interference in 
elections, this position is unsustainable and Facebook, and other platforms, must begin 
to take responsibility for the way in which their platforms are used.
45. Electoral law in this country is not fit for purpose for the digital age, and needs 
to be amended to reflect new technologies. We support the Electoral Commission’s 
suggestion that all electronic campaigning should have easily accessible digital imprint 
requirements, including information on the publishing organisation and who is legally 
responsible for the spending, so that it is obvious at a glance who has sponsored that 
campaigning material, thereby bringing all online advertisements and messages into 
line with physically published leaflets, circulars and advertisements. We note that a 
56 Digital campaigning: increasing transparency for voters, Electoral Commission, 25 June 2018
57 Q2618
58 Claire Bassett, Q2617
59 Report of the Independent Commission on Referendums UCL Constitution Unit, July 2018
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similar recommendation was made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and 
urge the Government to study the practicalities of giving the Electoral Commission this 
power in its White Paper.
46. As well as having digital imprints, the Government should consider the feasibility 
of clear, persistent banners on all paid-for political adverts and videos, indicating 
the source and making it easy for users to identify what is in the adverts, and who the 
advertiser is.
47. The Electoral Commission’s current maximum fine limit of £20,000 should be 
changed to a larger fine based on a fixed percentage of turnover, such as has been 
granted recently to the Information Commissioner’s Office in the Data Protection Act 
2018. Furthermore, the Electoral Commission should have the ability to refer matters to 
the Crown Prosecution Service, before their investigations have been completed.
48. Electoral law needs to be updated to reflect changes in campaigning techniques, 
and the move from physical leaflets and billboards to online, micro-targeted political 
campaigning, as well as the many digital subcategories covered by paid and organic 
campaigning. The Government must carry out a comprehensive review of the current 
rules and regulations surrounding political work during elections and referenda, 
including: increasing the length of the regulated period; definitions of what constitutes 
political campaigning; absolute transparency of online political campaigning; a category 
introduced for digital spending on campaigns; reducing the time for spending returns to 
be sent to the Electoral Commission (the current time for large political organisations is 
six months); and increasing the fine for not complying with the electoral law.
49. The Government should consider giving the Electoral Commission the power to 
compel organisations that it does not specifically regulate, including tech companies and 
individuals, to provide information relevant to their inquiries, subject to due process.
50. The Electoral Commission should also establish a code for advertising through 
social media during election periods, giving consideration to whether such activity 
should be restricted during the regulated period, to political organisations or campaigns 
that have registered with the Commission. Both the Electoral Commission and the ICO 
should consider the ethics of Facebook or other relevant social media companies selling 
lookalike political audiences to advertisers during the regulated period, where they are 
using the data they hold on their customers to guess whether their political interests 
are similar to those profiles held in target audiences already collected by a political 
campaign. In particular, we would ask them to consider whether users of Facebook 
or other relevant social media companies should have the right to opt out from being 
included in such lookalike audiences.
Platform or publisher?
51. How should tech companies be defined—as a platform, a publisher, or something 
in between? The definition of ‘publisher’ gives the impression that tech companies have 
the potential to limit freedom of speech, by choosing what to publish and what not to 
publish. Monika Bickert, Head of Global Policy Management, Facebook, told us that 
“our community would not want us, a private company, to be the arbiter of truth”.60 The 
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definition of ‘platform’ gives the impression that these companies do not create or control 
the content themselves, but are merely the channel through which content is made available. 
Yet Facebook is continually altering what we see, as is shown by its decision to prioritise 
content from friends and family, which then feeds into users’ newsfeed algorithm.61
52. Frank Sesno, Director of the School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington 
University, told us in Washington D.C. that “they have this very strange, powerful, hybrid 
identity as media companies that do not create any of the content but should and must—to 
their own inadequate levels—accept some responsibility for promulgating it. What they 
fear most is regulation—a requirement to turn over their data”.62
53. At both our evidence session and at a separate speech in March 2018, the then 
Secretary of State for DCMS, Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, noted the complexity of 
making any legislative changes to tech companies’ liabilities, putting his weight behind 
“a new definition” that was “more subtle” than the binary choice between platform and 
publisher.63 He told us that the Government has launched the Cairncross Review to look 
(within the broader context of the future of the press in the UK) at the role of the digital 
advertising supply chain, at how fair and transparent it is, and whether it “incentivises 
the proliferation of inaccurate and/or misleading news.” The review is also examining 
the role and impact of digital search engines and social media companies including an 
assessment of regulation “or further collaboration between the platforms and publishers.” 
The consultation closes in September 2018.64
54. In Germany, tech companies were asked to remove hate speech within 24 hours. This 
self-regulation did not work, so the German Government passed the Network Enforcement 
Act, commonly known as NetzDG, which became law in January 2018. This legislation 
forces tech companies to remove hate speech from their sites within 24 hours, and fines 
them 20 million Euros if it is not removed.65
55. Some say that the NetzDG regulation is a blunt instrument, which could be seen to 
tamper with free speech, and is specific to one country, when the extent of the content spans 
many countries. Monika Bickert, from Facebook, told us that “sometimes regulations can 
take us to a place—you have probably seen some of the commentary about the NetzDG 
law in Germany—where there will be broader societal concerns about content that we are 
removing and whether that line is in the right place”.66 The then Secretary of State was also 
wary of the German legislation because “when a regulator gets to the position where they 
are policing the publication of politicians then you are into tricky territory”.67 However, 
as a result of this law, one in six of Facebook’s moderators now works in Germany, which 
is practical evidence that legislation can work.68
56. Within social media, there is little or no regulation. Hugely important and 
influential subjects that affect us—political opinions, mental health, advertising, 
61 Monika Bickert, Q434
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66 Q386
67 Q973
68 Professor Lewandowsky, Q233
 Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report 18
data privacy—are being raised, directly or indirectly, in these tech spaces. People’s 
behaviour is being modified and changed as a result of social media companies. There 
is currently no sign of this stopping.
57. Social media companies cannot hide behind the claim of being merely a ‘platform’, 
claiming that they are tech companies and have no role themselves in regulating the 
content of their sites. That is not the case; they continually change what is and is not 
seen on their sites, based on algorithms and human intervention. However, they are also 
significantly different from the traditional model of a ‘publisher’, which commissions, 
pays for, edits and takes responsibility for the content it disseminates.
58. We recommend that a new category of tech company is formulated, which 
tightens tech companies’ liabilities, and which is not necessarily either a ‘platform’ or 
a ‘publisher’. We anticipate that the Government will put forward these proposals in 
its White Paper later this year and hope that sufficient time will be built in for our 
Committee to comment on new policies and possible legislation.
59. We support the launch of the Government’s Cairncross Review, which has been 
charged with studying the role of the digital advertising supply chain, and whether 
its model incentivises the proliferation of inaccurate or misleading news. We propose 
that this Report is taken into account as a submission to the Cairncross Review. We 
recommend that the possibility of the Advertising Standards Agency regulating digital 
advertising be considered as part of the Review. We ourselves plan to take evidence on 
this question this autumn, from the ASA themselves, and as part of wider discussions 
with DCMS and Ofcom.
60. It is our recommendation that this process should establish clear legal liability for 
the tech companies to act against harmful and illegal content on their platforms. This 
should include both content that has been referred to them for takedown by their users, 
and other content that should have been easy for the tech companies to identify for 
themselves. In these cases, failure to act on behalf of the tech companies could leave them 
open to legal proceedings launched either by a public regulator, and/or by individuals or 
organisations who have suffered as a result of this content being freely disseminated on 
a social media platform.
Transparency
61. What we found, time and again, during the course of our inquiry, was the failure 
on occasions of Facebook and other tech companies, to provide us with the information 
that we sought. We undertook fifteen exchanges of correspondence with Facebook, and 
two oral evidence sessions, in an attempt to elicit some of the information that they held, 
including information regarding users’ data, foreign interference and details of the so-
called ‘dark ads’ that had reached Facebook users.69 Facebook consistently responded 
to questions by giving the minimal amount of information possible, and routinely 
failed to offer information relevant to the inquiry, unless it had been expressly asked 
for. It provided witnesses who have been unwilling or unable to give full answers to the 
69 Oral evidence session, 8 February 2018; oral evidence session, 26 April 2018; exchanges of correspondence 
between the Chair of the DCMS Committee and Facebook representatives, between 24 October and 8 June 
2018, can be found on the DCMS Committee’s inquiry page.
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Committee’s questions. This is the reason why the Committee has continued to press for 
Mark Zuckerberg to appear as a witness as, by his own admission, he is the person who 
decides what happens at Facebook.
62. We ask, once more, for Mr Zuckerberg to come to the Committee to answer the 
many outstanding questions to which Facebook has not responded adequately to date. 
Edward Lucas, a writer and security policy expert, rightly told us that Facebook should 
not be in a position of marking its own homework: “They have a duty as a platform to have 
transparent rules that can be discussed with the outside world and we should be able to 
check stuff. […] We cannot just trust Facebook to go after the event and say, ‘Nothing to 
see here, move along’. We should be able to see in real time who is advertising”.70
63. As the then Secretary of State, Rt Hon Matthew Hancock MP, pointed out when he 
gave evidence to us, the Defamation Act 2013 contains provisions stating that, if a user is 
defamed on social media, and the offending individual cannot be identified, the liability 
rests with the platform.71
64. Tech companies are not passive platforms on which users input content; they 
reward what is most engaging, because engagement is part of their business model and 
their growth strategy. They have profited greatly by using this model. This manipulation 
of the sites by tech companies must be made more transparent. Facebook has all of the 
information. Those outside of the company have none of it, unless Facebook chooses 
to release it. Facebook was reluctant to share information with the Committee, which 
does not bode well for future transparency. We ask, once more, for Mr Zuckerberg to 
come to the Committee to answer the many outstanding questions to which Facebook 
has not responded adequately, to date.
65. Facebook and other social media companies should not be in a position of ‘marking 
their own homework’. As part of its White Paper this Autumn, the Government need to 
carry out proactive work to find practical solutions to issues surrounding transparency 
that will work for both users, the Government, and the tech companies.
66. Facebook and other social media companies have a duty to publish and to follow 
transparent rules. The Defamation Act 2013 contains provisions stating that, if a user is 
defamed on social media, and the offending individual cannot be identified, the liability 
rests with the platform. We urge the Government to examine the effectiveness of these 
provisions, and to monitor tech companies to ensure they are complying with court 
orders in the UK and to provide details of the source of disputed content—including 
advertisements—to ensure that they are operating in accordance with the law, or any 
future industry Codes of Ethics or Conduct. Tech companies also have a responsibility 
to ensure full disclosure of the source of any political advertising they carry.
Bots
67. Bots are algorithmically-driven computer programmes designed to carry out specific 
tasks online, such as analysing and scraping data. Some are created for political purposes, 
such as automatically posting content, increasing follower numbers, supporting political 
campaigns, or for spreading misinformation and disinformation. Samantha Bradshaw, 
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from the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, described the different types of 
bots, with some being completely automated and some with real people who engage with 
the automated bots, described as ‘cyborgs’: “Those accounts are a lot harder to detect for 
researchers, because they feel a lot more genuine. Instead of just automating a bunch of 
tweets, so that something retweets different accounts 100 times a day, bots might actually 
post comments and talk with other users—real people—on the accounts”.72
68. When she gave evidence in February 2018, Monika Bickert, Head of Global Policy 
Management at Facebook, would not confirm whether there were around 50,000 bot 
accounts during the US presidential election of 2016.73 However, when Mike Schroepfer, 
CTO of Facebook, gave evidence in April 2018, after the Cambridge Analytica events had 
unfolded, he was more forthcoming about the problem of bots:
The key thing here is people trying to create inauthentic identities on 
Facebook, claiming they are someone other than who they are. To give 
you a sense of the scale of that problem and the means, while we are in 
this testimony today it is likely we will be blocking hundreds of thousands 
of attempts by people around the world to create fake accounts through 
automated systems. This is literally a day-to-day fight to make sure that 
people who are trying to abuse the platform are kept off it and to make sure 
that people use Facebook for what we want it for, which is to share it with 
our friends.74
69. Mike Schroepfer also said that removal of such bots can be difficult, and was evasive 
about how many fake accounts had been removed, telling us: “We are purging fake accounts 
all the time and dealing with fraudulent ads and we do not tend to report each specific 
instance. I know we report aggregate statistics on a regular basis, but it is not something 
we are reporting here or there, so I don’t know.75 The problem with removing such bots 
without a systematic appraisal of their composition means that valuable information is 
then lost. Such information would prove invaluable to researchers involved in making 
connections, in order to prevent future attacks by malign players.
Algorithms
70. Both social media companies and search engines use algorithms, or sequences 
of instructions, to personalise news and other content for users. The algorithms select 
content based on factors such as a user’s past online activity, social connections, and 
their location. Samantha Bradshaw, from the Oxford Internet Institute, told us about the 
power of Facebook to manipulate people’s emotions by showing different types of stories 
to them: “If you showed them more negative stories, they would feel more negatively. If 
you showed them positive stories, they would feel more positive”.76 The tech companies’ 
business models rely on revenue coming from the sale of adverts and, because the bottom 
line is profit, negative emotions (which appear more quickly than positive emotions) will 
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71. Information about algorithms that dictate what users see on their News Feed is not 
publicly available. But just as information about the tech companies themselves needs to 
be more transparent, so does information about the algorithms themselves. These can 
carry inherent biases, such as those involving gender and race, as a result of algorithms 
development by engineers; these biases are then replicated, spread, and reinforced. Monika 
Bickert, from Facebook, admitted that Facebook was concerned about “any type of bias, 
whether gender bias, racial bias or other forms of bias that could affect the way that work 
is done at our company. That includes working on algorithms”. She went on to describe 
ways in which they were attempting to address this problem, including “initiatives 
ongoing, right now, to try to develop talent in under-represented communities”.77 In 
our opinion, Facebook should be taking a more active and urgent role in tackling such 
inherent biases in algorithm development by engineers, to prevent these biases being 
replicated and reinforced. Claire Wardle, Executive Director of First Draft News, told us 
of the importance to get behind the ‘black box’ of the working of algorithms, in order to 
understand the rules and motivations of the tech companies:
What are the questions to ask a platform about why it was created? What 
are the metrics for that particular algorithm? How can we have more insight 
into that algorithm? How can we think about frameworks of algorithms? 
Irrespective of the platform, how can we set up that framework so that 
platforms have to be not just transparent but transparent across particular 
aspects and elements?78
72. Just as the finances of companies are audited and scrutinised, the same type of 
auditing and scrutinising should be carried out on the non-financial aspects of technology 
companies, including their security mechanisms and algorithms, to ensure they are 
operating responsibly. The Government should provide the appropriate body with the 
power to audit these companies, including algorithmic auditing, and we reiterate the 
point that the ICO’s powers should be substantially strengthened in these respects.
73. If companies like Facebook and Twitter fail to act against fake accounts, and 
properly account for the estimated total of fake accounts on their sites at any one time, 
this could not only damage the user experience, but potentially defraud advertisers who 
could be buying target audiences on the basis that the user profiles are connected to real 
people. We ask the Competition and Markets Authority to consider conducting an audit 
of the operation of the advertising market on social media.
Privacy settings and ‘terms and conditions’
74. Facebook and other tech companies make it hard for users to protect their own data. 
A report by the Norwegian Consumer Council, ‘Deceived by Design’, published in June 
2018, highlighted the fact that Facebook, Google and Microsoft direct users away from 
privacy-friendly options on their services in an “unethical” way, while giving users “an 
illusion of control”.79 Users’ privacy rights are usually hidden in tech companies’ ‘terms 
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and conditions’ policies, which themselves are complicated, and do not follow their own 
terms of conditions in ensuring that they are age appropriate and that age ratification 
takes place.80
75. Social media companies have a legal duty to inform users of their privacy rights. 
Companies give users the illusion of users having freedom over how they control their 
data, but they make it extremely difficult, in practice, for users to protect their data. 
Complicated and lengthy terms and conditions, small buttons to protect our data and 
large buttons to share our data mean that, although in principle we have the ability 
to practise our rights over our data—through for example the GDPR and the Data 
Protection Act—in practice it is made hard for us.
76. The UK Government should consider establishing a digital Atlantic Charter 
as a new mechanism to reassure users that their digital rights are guaranteed. This 
innovation would demonstrate the UK’s commitment to protecting and supporting users, 
and establish a formal basis for collaboration with the US on this issue. The Charter 
would be voluntary, but would be underpinned by a framework setting out clearly the 
respective legal obligations in signatory countries. This would help ensure alignment, if 
not in law, then in what users can expect in terms of liability and protections.
‘Free Basics’ and Burma
77. One of Facebook’s unofficial company mottoes was to “move quickly and break 
things”; to take risks, to not consider the consequences. Sandy Parakilas, an ex-Facebook 
employee, told us that most of the goals of the company were centred around growth, 
in terms of the number of people using the service and the subsequent revenue.81 But 
with growth comes unintended consequences, if that growth happens unchecked. This 
unchecked growth of Facebook is continuing. ‘Free Basics’ is a Facebook service that 
provides people in developing countries with mobile phone access to various services 
without data charges. This content includes news, employment, health, information and 
local information. Free Basics is available in 63 countries around the world.82
78. Out of a 50 million population in Burma, there are 30 million monthly active 
users on Facebook.83 While Free Basics gives internet access for the majority of people 
in Burma, at the same time it severely limits the information available to users, making 
Facebook virtually the only source of information online for the majority of people in 
Burma.84 The United Nations accused Facebook of playing a determining role in stirring 
up hatred against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State. In March 2018, the 
UN Myanmar investigator Yanghee Lee said that the platform had morphed into a ‘beast’ 
that helped to spread vitriol against Rohingya Muslins.85
79. When Mike Schroepfer, the CTO at Facebook, gave evidence in April 2018, he 
described the situation in Burma as “awful”, and that “we need to and are trying to do a 
lot more to get hate speech and all this kind of vile content off the platform”,86 but he could 
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not tell us when Facebook had started work on limiting hate speech, he could not tell us 
how many fake accounts had been identified and removed from Burma, and he could not 
tell us how much revenue Facebook was making from Facebook users in Burma.87
80. Mr. Schroepfer promised to submit supplementary evidence to give us that 
information. However, Facebook’s supplementary evidence stated: “We do not break down 
the removal of fake accounts by country. […] Myanmar [Burma] is a small market for 
Facebook. We do not publish country advertising revenue figures”.88 We sent yet another 
letter, asking why Facebook does not break down the removal of fake accounts by country, 
which seems a serious lapse in demonstrating how it takes responsibility when problems 
with fake accounts arise.89 To date, we have not received an answer.
81. UK aid to Burma is planned at £100 million for 2018.90 The Department for 
International Development told the International Development Committee that “for our 
programme to be successful, Burma must work towards the implementation of inclusive 
peace agreements, a new political settlement; and the military serving, rather than ruling, 
Burma”.91 To date, the UK’s total support for the crisis since August 2017 is £129 million.
82. The United Nations has named Facebook as being responsible for inciting hatred 
against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Burma, through its ‘Free Basics’ service. It 
provides people free mobile phone access without data charges, but is also responsible 
for the spread disinformation and propaganda. The CTO of Facebook, Mike Schroepfer 
described the situation in Burma as “awful”, yet Facebook cannot show us that it has 
done anything to stop the spread of disinformation against the Rohingya minority.
83. The hate speech against the Rohingya—built up on Facebook, much of which is 
disseminated through fake accounts—and subsequent ethnic cleansing, has potentially 
resulted in the success of DFID’s aid programmes being greatly reduced, based on the 
qualifications they set for success. The activity of Facebook undermines international aid 
to Burma, including the UK Government’s work. Facebook is releasing a product that is 
dangerous to consumers and deeply unethical. We urge the Government to demonstrate 
how seriously it takes Facebook’s apparent collusion in spreading disinformation in 
Burma, at the earliest opportunity. This is a further example of Facebook failing to take 
responsibility for the misuse of its platform.
Code of Ethics and developments
84. Facebook has hampered our efforts to get information about their company 
throughout this inquiry. It is as if it thinks that the problem will go away if it does not 
share information about the problem, and reacts only when it is pressed. Time and again 
we heard from Facebook about mistakes being made and then (sometimes) rectified, 
rather than designing the product ethically from the beginning of the process. Facebook 
has a ‘Code of Conduct’, which highlights the principles by which Facebook staff carry 
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out their work, and states that employees are expected to “act lawfully, honestly, ethically, 
and in the best interests of the company while performing duties on behalf of Facebook”.92 
Facebook has fallen well below this standard in Burma.
85. The then Secretary of State, Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, talked about the need for tech 
companies to move from a libertarian attitude—“the foundation of the internet”—to one 
of “liberal values on the internet, which is supporting and cherishing the freedom but not 
the freedom to harm others”.93 He warned that tech company leaders have a responsibility, 
otherwise responsibility will be imposed on them: “I do not, for a moment, buy this idea 
that just because the internet is global therefore nation states do not have a say in it. We 
are responsible. We collectively, Parliament is responsible, for the statutory rules where 
our society lives”.94
Monopolies and the business models of tech companies
86. The dominance of a handful of powerful tech companies, such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Google, has resulted in their behaving as if they were monopolies in their specific 
area. Traditionally, the basis of competition policy with regard to monopolies has been 
the issue of consumer detriment, such as the risk of overcharging. However, in the tech 
world, consumer detriment is harder to quantify. In the digital sphere, many of these 
services have marginal running costs, are free to the consumer at the point of use, and 
have the potential of benefiting the consumer from being monopolistic—the sharing of 
information is the point of these companies and improves the accuracy of services such as 
Google Maps. As the Secretary of State told us, “The whole question of the concept of how 
we run competition policy in an era where many goods and many other new innovations 
have zero marginal costs and are free is intellectually difficult.”95
87. With the free access of services must come the means of funding the businesses; tech 
companies’ business models rely on the data of users for advertisers to utilise, in order 
to maximise their revenue. Facebook and Google have 60% of US digital ad spend and 
20% of total global spend, as of February 2018.96 Therefore, consumer protection in the 
modern world is not only about goods, it is about the protection of data. Tech companies’ 
business models have extolled the fact that they are offering innovations that are free to 
use, but in doing so the users become the product of the companies, and this is where 
issues of mistrust and misuse arise. The new measures in GDPR allow users to see what 
data the companies hold about them, and users can request their data to be removed or 
transferred to other tech companies, but in order for this to be effective, users must have 
knowledge of and utilise these rights.97
88. Professor Bakir, from Bangor University, talked of how technology continually 
changes, with people adapting to that technology in unpredictable ways.98 She suggested 
the establishment of a working group, to monitor what is being developed in the area of 
misinformation and disinformation because “what is around the corner may be much 
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more worrying than what we have experienced to date”.99 As technology develops so 
quickly, regulation needs to be based not on specifics, but on principles, and adaptive 
enough to withstand technological developments.
89. A professional global Code of Ethics should be developed by tech companies, in 
collaboration with this and other governments, academics, and interested parties, 
including the World Summit on Information Society, to set down in writing what is and 
what is not acceptable by users on social media, with possible liabilities for companies 
and for individuals working for those companies, including those technical engineers 
involved in creating the software for the companies. New products should be tested to 
ensure that products are fit-for-purpose and do not constitute dangers to the users, or 
to society.
90. The Code of Ethics should be the backbone of tech companies’ work, and should be 
continually referred to when developing new technologies and algorithms. If companies 
fail to adhere to their own Code of Ethics, the UK Government should introduce 
regulation to make such ethical rules compulsory.
91. The dominance of a handful of powerful tech companies, such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Google, has resulted in their behaving as if they were monopolies in their specific 
area. While this portrayal of tech companies does not appreciate the benefits of a shared 
service, where people can communicate freely, there are considerations around the data 
on which those services are based, and how these companies are using the vast amount 
of data they hold on users. In its White Paper, the Government must set out why the 
issue of monopolies is different in the tech world, and the measures needed to protect 
users’ data.
99 Q233
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3 The issue of data targeting, based 
around the Facebook, GSR and 
Cambridge Analytica allegations
92. Arguably more invasive than obviously false information is the relentless targeting of 
hyper-partisan views, which play to the fears and the prejudices of people, in order to alter 
their voting plans. This targeting formed the basis of the revelations of March 2018, which 
brought to the general public’s attention the facts about how much of their own personal 
data is in the public domain, unprotected, and available for use by different players. Some 
of the events surrounding Cambridge Analytica and its use of Facebook data had been 
revealed at the end of 2015, when Harry Davies published an article in The Guardian, 
following investigations lasting around a year, and wrote: “a little known data company 
[Cambridge Analytica] […] paid researchers at Cambridge University to gather detailed 
psychological profiles about the US electorate using a massive pool of mainly unwitting 
US Facebook users built with an online survey”.100
93. Based on our knowledge of this article, we had explored the general issues 
surrounding the manipulation of data when we questioned Facebook in February 2018. 
However, it was in March 2018 when facts about this case became better known across 
the world, including how people’s data was used to influence election campaigning, in the 
US and the UK, through the work of Carole Cadwalladr, at The Observer, and the whistle-
blower Christopher Wylie, a former employee of SCL Group, and Cambridge Analytica. 
Shortly after going public with his allegations, Christopher Wylie gave evidence to the 
Committee.101 This chapter will focus on the events that highlighted the extent of the 
misuse of data, involving various organisations including Facebook, Global Science 
Research (GSR), Cambridge Analytica, and Aggregate IQ (AIQ), and the alleged sharing 
of data in the EU Referendum. We received written and oral evidence from many of those 
intimately involved in these revelations. Issues relating to these companies and political 
campaigning are further examined in Chapter 4, as well as evidence regarding SCL’s 
involvement in overseas elections in Chapter 6.
Cambridge Analytica and micro-targeting
94. Cambridge Analytica was founded in 2012, with backing from the US hedge 
fund billionaire and Donald Trump donor, Robert Mercer, who became the majority 
shareholder.102 He was the largest donor to the super political action committee (PAC) 
that supported the presidential campaigns of Ted Cruz and Donald Trump in the 2016 
presidential election.103 Christopher Wylie argued that the funding of Cambridge 
Analytica enabled Mr Mercer to benefit from political campaigns that he supported, 
without directly spending money on them, thereby bypassing electoral finance laws: 
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“[Robert Mercer] can put in $15 million to create something and then only charge $50,000 
for it. It would have been physically impossible to get the same value and level of service 
and data for that amount of money in any other way”.104
95. Cambridge Analytica was born out of the already established SCL consultancy, which 
had engaged in political campaigns around the world, using specialist communications 
techniques previously developed by the military to combat terror organisations, 
and to disrupt enemy intelligence and to give on the ground support in war zones. 
Cambridge Analytica’s primary purpose would instead be to focus on data targeting and 
communications campaigns for carefully selected Republican Party candidates in the 
United States of America.
96. Steve Bannon served as White House chief strategist at the start of President Donald 
Trump’s term, having previously been chief executive of President Trump’s general election 
campaign. He was the executive chairman of Breitbart News, a website he described as ‘the 
platform of the alt-right,’105 and was the former Vice President of Cambridge Analytica. 
A Cambridge Analytica invoice to UKIP was billed to the same address as Steve Bannon’s 
company, Glittering Steel.106 The Committee was also told that Steve Bannon introduced 
Cambridge Analytica to Arron Banks and to Leave.EU.107
97. We heard evidence from Alexander Nix, in February 2018, before the Observer and 
Guardian revelations in March 2018, and before the company and its associated company 
had gone into administration.108 Alexander Nix described the micro-targeting business 
of Cambridge Analytica:
We are trying to make sure that voters receive messages on the issues and 
policies that they care most about, and we are trying to make sure that they 
are not bombarded with irrelevant materials. That can only be good. That 
can only be good for politics, it can only be good for democracy and it can 
be good in the wider realms of communication and advertising.109
98. The use of data analytics, based on the psychological profile of the audience, was at 
the heart of the work of Cambridge Analytica, “presenting a fact that is underpinned by an 
emotion”, as described by Mr. Nix.110 In order to match the right type of message to voters, 
Cambridge Analytica needed information about voters, such as what merchandise they 
bought, what media they read, what cars they drove.111 Mr. Nix told us that “we are able to 
match these data with first-party research, being large, quantitative research instruments, 
not dissimilar to a poll. We can go out and ask audiences about their preferences […] 
indeed we can also start to probe questions about personality and other drivers that might 
be relevant to understanding their behaviour and purchasing decisions”.112 Cambridge 
Analytica used ‘OCEAN psychological analysis’ to identify issues people might support 
and how to position the arguments to them. OCEAN categorises people based on their 
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‘Openness’, ‘Conscientiousness’, ‘Extraversion’, ‘Agreeableness’ and ‘Neuroticism’.113 As 
Alexander Nix explained in his talk at the 2016 Concordia Annual Summit, entitled 
‘The Power of Big Data and Psychographics’, this approach helps you, for example, to 
decide how to persuade American voters on the importance of protection of the second 
amendment, which guarantees the right to keep and bear arms. In the example Mr Nix 
showed, you might play on the fears of someone who could be frightened into believing 
that they needed the right to have a gun to protect their home from intruders.114
99. When asked where the data used by Cambridge Analytica came from, Alexander 
Nix told us: “We do not work with Facebook data, and we do not have Facebook data. 
We do use Facebook as a platform to advertise, as do all brands and most agencies, or all 
agencies, I should say. We use Facebook as a means to gather data. We roll out surveys 
on Facebook that the public can engage with if they elect to”.115 When asked whether 
Cambridge Analytica was able to use information on users’ Facebook profile when they 
complete surveys, Mr. Nix replied, “No, absolutely not. Absolutely not”.116
100. Professor David Carroll, a US citizen, made a Subject Access Request (SAR) to 
Cambridge Analytica in January 2017, under the Data Protection Act 1998, because he 
believed that his data was being processed in the UK. He told us “there was no indication 
of where they obtained the data. […] We should be able to know where they got the data, 
how they processed it, what they used it for, who they shared it with and also whether we 
have a right to opt out of it and have them delete the data and stop processing it in the 
future”.117 The ICO’s investigation update of 11 July 2018 described Professor Carroll’s 
case as “a specific example of Cambridge Analytica/SCL’s poor practice with regard to 
data protection law”.118
101. The ICO served an Enforcement Notice on SCL Elections Ltd on 4 May 2018, ordering 
it to comply with the terms of the SAR, by providing copies of all personal information 
that SCL held on Professor Carroll. However, the terms of the Enforcement Notice were 
not complied with by the deadline of 3 June 2018, and the ICO is now considering criminal 
action against Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections Ltd.119
Global Science Research
102. The Facebook data breach in 2014, and the role of Cambridge Analytica in acquiring 
this data, has been the subject of intense scrutiny. Ultimately the data breach originated 
at the source of the data, at Facebook. ‘Friends permissions’ were a set of permissions on 
Facebook between 2010 and 2014, and allowed developers to access data related to users’ 
friends, without the knowledge or express consent of those friends.120 One such developer, 
Aleksandr Kogan, an American citizen who had been born in the former Soviet Union, 
was a Research Associate and University Lecturer at the University of Cambridge in the 
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Department of Psychology. Kogan began collaborating “directly” with Facebook in 2013, 
and he told us that they “provided me with several macro-level datasets on friendship 
connections and emoticon usage.”121
103. Professor Kogan set up his own business, Global Science Research (GSR), in the spring 
of 2014, and developed an App, called the GSR App, which collected data from users, at 
an individual level.122 It was at around this time as well that Dr Kogan was in discussions 
about working on some projects with SCL Elections and Cambridge Analytica, to see 
whether his data collection and analysis methods could help the audience targeting of 
digital campaigns. Professor Kogan explained that he did not sell the GSR App itself as 
“it is not technically challenging in any way. Facebook explains how to do it, so there is 
great documentation on this”.123 What was valuable was the data. The aim was to recruit 
around 200,000 people who could earn money by completing an online survey. Recruits 
had to download the App before they could collect payment. The App would download 
some information about the user and their friends. Each person was paid $3 or $4, which 
totalled $600,000 to $800,000 across all participants. In this case SCL paid that amount, 
and then returned to get predictions about people’s personalities, for which they paid GSR 
£230,000.124 In the latter part of 2014, after the GSR App data collection was complete, 
Professor Kogan revised the application to become an interactive personality “quiz” and 
renamed the App “thisisyourdigitallife.”125
104. The exact nature of Dr Kogan’s work on this project is set out in the contract he 
signed with SCL, on 4 June 2014, along with his business partner, Joseph Chancellor, who 
was later hired to work for Facebook.126 Alexander Nix also signed this contract on behalf 
of SCL Elections. In the ‘Project and Specification’ schedule of the contract it states that 
‘After data is collected, models are built using psychometric techniques (e.g. factor analysis, 
dimensional scaling etc) which uses Facebook likes to predict people’s personality scores. 
These models are validity tested on users who were not part of the training sample. Trait 
predictions based on Facebook likes are at near test-retest levels and have been compared 
to the predictions that romantic partners, family members and friends make about their 
traits. In all previous cases the computer-generated scores performed the best. Thus, the 
computer-generated scores can be more accurate than even the knowledge of very close 
friends and family members.’127
105. Furthermore, Dr Kogan and SCL knew that ‘scraping’ Facebook user data in this 
way was in breach of the company’s then recently revised terms of service. Instead the 
work was carried out under the terms of an agreement GSR has with Facebook which 
predated this change. It is stated in the contract that, “GSR’s method relies on a pre-
existing application functioning under Facebook’s old terms of service. New applications 
are not able to access friend networks and no other psychometric profiling applications 
exist under the old Facebook terms.”128
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106. The purpose of the project, however, was not to carry out this testing as part of an 
experiment into the predictive nature of understanding the insights about an individual 
that are provided by Facebook likes. Rather, data would be scraped to order to support 
political campaigns. Cambridge Analytica was involved with in eleven states in the USA in 
2014. These were Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina and West Virginia.129 Dr Kogan and his team 
were required under the contract to provide SCL with data sets that matched predictive 
personality scores, including someone’s likely political interests, to named individuals on 
the electoral register in those states.
107. When Dr Kogan gave evidence to us, he stated that he believed using Facebook likes 
to predict someone’s personality and interests was not particularly accurate. However, 
from the contract he signed with SCL in June 2014, he certainly thought it was at the 
time. Furthermore, Dr Kogan’s colleague at the Cambridge Psychometrics Centre, Michal 
Kosinski, co-authored an academic paper called ‘Tracking the Digital Footprints of 
Personality’, published in December 2014, where he re-states the case or the effectiveness 
of assessing personality from Facebook likes.130 This article claims that “Facebook likes 
are highly predictive of personality and number[s] of other psychodemographic traits, 
such as age, gender, intelligence, political and religious views, and sexual orientation”. The 
article goes on, rightly, to raise the ethical concerns that should exist in relation to this 
approach, stating that:
The results presented here may have considerable negative implications 
because it can easily be applied to large numbers of people without 
obtaining their individual consent and without them noticing. Commercial 
companies, governmental institutions, or even one’s Facebook friends could 
use software to infer personality (and other attributes, such as intelligence 
or sexual orientation) that an individual may not have intended to share. 
There is a risk that the growing awareness of such digital exposure may 
decrease their trust in digital technologies, or even completely deter them 
from them.131
108. When Alexander Nix first gave evidence to us in February 2018, he denied that Dr 
Kogan and GSR had supplied Cambridge Analytica with any data or information, and that 
his datasets were not based on information received from GSR.132 We received evidence 
from both Dr Kogan and Mr Wylie that conflicted with Mr Nix’s evidence; indeed, Mr 
Wylie described the data obtained from Dr Kogan’s GSR App as the foundation dataset of 
the company, which collected data on up to 87 million users, over 1 million of whom were 
based in the UK.133 We believe that Dr Kogan also knew perfectly well what he was doing, 
and that he was in breach of Facebook’s own codes of conduct (which he told us he did not 
consider to be operative in practice, as they were never enforced).
109. During his second appearance, Mr Nix admitted that “I accept that some of my 
answers could have been clearer, but I assure you that I did not intend to mislead you”. He 
went on to explain that Cambridge Analytica had not at that time been in possession of 
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data from GSR, due to the fact that they had “deleted all such data licensed in good faith 
from GSR under that research contract”.134 This suggests that Mr. Nix, who by his own 
admission to the Committee tells lies, was not telling the whole truth when he gave us his 
previous version of events, in February 2018.
110. In August 2014 Dr Kogan worked with SCL to provide data on individual voters to 
support US candidates being promoted by the John Bolton Super Pac in the mid-term 
elections in November of that year. Psychographic profiling was used to micro-target 
adverts at voters across five distinct personality groups. After the campaign, according 
to an SCL presentation document seen by the Committee, the company claimed that 
there was a 39% increase in awareness of the issues featured in the campaign’s advertising 
amongst those who had received targeted messages.135 In September 2014, SCL also signed 
a contract to work with the American Conservative advocacy organisation, ‘For America’. 
Again, they used behavioural micro-targeting to support their campaign messages ahead 
of the mid-term elections that year. SCL would later claim that the 1.5million advertising 
impressions they generated through their campaign led to a 30% uplift in voter turnout, 
against the predicted turnout, for the targeted groups.
Facebook
111. Sandy Parakilas worked for Facebook for 16 months in 2011 and 2012, and told us 
that “once the data passed from Facebook servers to the developer, Facebook lost insight 
into what was being done with the data and lost control over the data”.136 There was no 
proper audit trail of where the data went and during Mr Parakilas’ 16 months of working 
there, he did not remember one audit of a developer’s storage.137 This is a fundamental 
flaw in Facebook’s model of holding data; Facebook cannot assure its users that its data is 
not being used by third parties and of the reasons for which that data may be being used.
112. Once the data had left Facebook, that data, or its derivatives, could be copied multiple 
times. Chris Vickery, Director of Cyber Risk Research at UpGuard, described to us the 
‘sticky’ nature of data: “In this type of industry, data does not just go away. It does not just 
disappear. It is sticky. It gathers up. The good stuff stays. Even the bad stuff stays, but it is 
not used. It is held in an archive somewhere. Nothing disappears”.138
113. Furthermore, that data was specific and personal to each person with a Facebook 
account, including their names, their email addresses, and could even include private 
messages.139 Tristan Harris, from the Center for Humane Technology, told us that the 
entire premise of Facebook’s App platform was exactly this—to enable third-party 
developers to have access to people’s friends’ data: “The premise of the app platform was 
to enable as many developers as possible to use that data in creative ways, to build creative 
new social applications on behalf of Facebook”.140
114. Facebook claimed that Dr Kogan had violated his agreement to use the data solely 
for academic purposes. On Friday 16 March 2018, Facebook suspended Kogan from the 
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platform, issued a statement saying that he “lied” to the company, and characterised his 
activities as “a scam—and a fraud”.141 Facebook also suspended Christopher Wylie at the 
same time. On Wednesday 21 March 2018, Mark Zuckerberg called Dr Kogan’s actions a 
“breach of trust”.142 However, when Facebook gave evidence to us in February 2018, they 
failed to disclose the existence of this “breach of trust” and its implications.
115. In its commitment to update our Committee on its ongoing investigation, the ICO 
decided to publish a Notice of Intent to issue a monetary penalty to Facebook of £500,000, 
“for lack of transparency and security issues relating to the harvesting of data constituting 
breaches of the first and seventh data protection principles”, under the Data Protection 
Act 1998.143 It should be noted that, if the new Data Protection Act 2018 had been in place 
when the ICO started its investigation into Facebook, the ICO’s Notice of Intent to impose 
4% of its annual turnover of $7.87 billion, which would have totalled £315 million.
116. As recently as 20 July 2018, Facebook suspended another company that it believes 
harvested data from its site. Crimson Hexagon is based in Boston, US. Facebook is 
investigating whether this analytics firm’s contracts with the US government and a Russian 
not-for-profit organisation with ties to the Kremlin violated Facebook’s policies. For 
Crimson Hexagon to share such data with government agencies would be incredibly useful 
to those agencies, as it would show how large groups of people were feeling at a particular 
time, and could be used during political campaigns.6 Again, the same opportunities 
given by Facebook to, unwittingly, share their users’ data with Cambridge Analytica, via 
GSR, were being given, up until a few days ago, to Crimson Hexagon, despite Facebook’s 
reassurances that they were tightening their policies.
Aggregate IQ (AIQ)
117. Jeff Silvester is one of the owners of the Canadian digital advertising web and software 
development company, Aggregate IQ (AIQ), which was incorporated in 2013. Mr Silvester 
gave evidence to us in May 2018 and explained that their first work for SCL was to “create 
a political customer relationship management software tool” for the Trinidad and Tobago 
election campaigning, in 2014.144 From that work, AIQ then started developing the Ripon 
tool, software that was commissioned and would be owned by SCL:145
The Ripon tool has been described in a lot of different ways. The part that we 
have done was a political customer relationship management tool focused 
on the US market. This was software that would help with people going 
door to door. There was a tool in there that you could do phone banking so 
you could call people and get their opinions on things and keep track of all 
that sort of information.146
118. Christopher Wylie gave us a different version of Ripon: “A lot of the papers that 
eventually became the foundation of the methods that were used on the Ripon project 
came out of research that was being done at the University of Cambridge, some of which 
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was funded in part by DARPA, which is the US military’s research agency”.147 Mr Wylie 
went on to explain that Ripon was the software that utilised the algorithms from the 
Facebook data.148
119. In its interim report published in July 2018, the ICO confirmed that AIQ had access 
to the personal data of UK voters, given by the Vote Leave campaign. The ICO is in the 
process of establishing from where AIQ accessed the personal data, and whether AIQ still 
holds that data. Furthermore, “we have however established, following a separate report, 
that [AIQ] hold UK data which they should not continue to hold”.149 In this regard, the 
ICO is working with the federal Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the Office of the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner, British Columbia.150
120. In the files presented to the committee by Chris Vickery, we have also found evidence 
that AIQ used tools that could scrape user profile data from LinkedIn. The App acts 
similarly to online human behaviour, searching LinkedIn user profiles, scraping their 
contacts, and all accompanying information such as users’ place of work, location and job 
title.151
121. There have been data privacy concerns raised about another campaign tool used, but 
not developed, by AIQ. A company called uCampaign has a mobile App that employs 
gamification strategy to political campaigns. Users can win points for campaign activity, 
like sending text messages and emails to their contacts and friends.152 The App was used in 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, and by Vote Leave during the Brexit Referendum.
122. The developer of the uCampaign app, Vladyslav Seryakov, is an Eastern Ukrainian 
military veteran who trained in computer programming at two elite Soviet universities in 
the late 1980s. The main investor in uCampaign is the American hedge fund magnate Sean 
Fieler, who is a close associate of the billionaire backer of SCL and Cambridge Analytica, 
Robert Mercer. An article published by Business Insider on 7 November 2016 states:
If users download the App and agree to share their address books, including 
phone numbers and emails, the App then shoots the data [to] a third-party 
vendor, which looks for matches to existing voter file information that 
could give clues as to what may motivate that specific voter. Thomas Peters, 
whose company uCampaign created Trump’s app, said the App is “going 
absolutely granular”, and will—with permission—send different A/B tested 
messages to users’ contacts based on existing information.153
The links between Cambridge Analytica, SCL and AIQ
123. AIQ’s first substantial work was for SCL, before it went on later to work for Vote 
Leave in the UK’s EU Referendum in 2016. According to evidence we have received, 
Alexander Nix and SCL also pitched for work in the Referendum to Leave.EU, but were 
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not successful.154 Throughout our inquiry, we have been concerned about the links within 
this seemingly small community involved in political micro-targeting and about the 
potential for data misuse. These concerns have been heightened by Mr Nix and SCL’s 
own links with organisations involved in the military, defence, intelligence and security 
realms.
124. Much effort has been expended in trying to untangle the complex web of relationships 
within what started out as the SCL (Strategic Communications Laboratories) group of 
companies, in which the founder Nigel Oakes and Alexander Nix have been involved, 
along with a myriad of changing shareholders. Confusion can perhaps be sourced to 
the use of the SCL name within both sets of businesses: the defence consultancy (SCL 
Group Limited), run by Mr Oakes, and the political consultancy (SCL Elections Limited), 
incorporated by Mr Nix in 2012. In evidence, however, Mr Nix certainly did not help, as he 
was evasive about the changes in beneficial ownership during the period when Cambridge 
Analytica operated.155
125. In February 2018, in response to a question about the distinction between SCL and 
Cambridge Analytica, Alexander Nix told us that “SCL is a very different company to 
Cambridge Analytica. It is a different company that has different employees who sit in a 
different office. It has a different board and a different board of advisers. It has different 
datasets, and it has different clients.”156
126. Christopher Wylie told us, in March 2018, that everyone who worked for Cambridge 
Analytica was “effectively” employed by SCL: “When I started in June 2013, Cambridge 
Analytica did not exist yet. It is important for people to understand that Cambridge 
Analytica is more of a concept or a brand than anything else because it does not have 
employees. It is all SCL, it is just the front-facing company for the United States”.157 No 
distinction was made by Mr Nix between SCL Elections Ltd and SCL Group Limited (to 
which he was apparently referring). In June, 2018, Mr Nix gave us graphics showing the 
changes to the group’s employment structure between 2005–2018, but these were not a 
map of the ownership changes.158
127. Corporate filings, however, show that after a period of independence under Mr Nix 
from 2012, in November 2015, SCL Elections formally rejoined the orbit of the wider SCL 
group. Nothwithstanding this, the Committee has seen internal documents from 27 May, 
2015 which show political and election projects being discussed under the banner of ‘SCL 
Group’.159 (We refer to one of these projects, relating to Argentina, in Chapter 6). By the 
time the whole group went into administration in April 2018, the US employing body, 
SCL USA Inc, was providing staff both to Cambridge Analytica LLC and the defence 
consultancy SCL Group.160
128. Throughout, Cambridge Analytica was also only 19% owned within the group, with 
the other shareholders unclear, despite our questioning over two evidence sessions with 
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Mr Nix. Wendy Siegelman and Ann Marlow created a chart in May 2017, including 30 
companies, with shareholders, interlinked within the SCL Group Ltd.161 That structure 
was again soon to change, however.
129. Brittany Kaiser told us, in April 2018, that when she joined the SCL Group, “it was a 
parent company of a few different divisions. One would be SCL Commercial, SCL Election, 
SCL Defence, SCL Social, and then Cambridge Analytica, which I understood was the US-
acting subsidiary.” She further explained that, once Cambridge Analytica had become a 
popular brand, it “subsumed most of those companies and divisions and the SCL Group 
became just our defence company, SLC Group or SCL.gov, based in Arlington”.162
130. In August 2017, a new ultimate holding company, Emerdata Limited, was incorporated 
at the same address, in Canary Wharf in London, as SCL Group.163 Alexander Nix was 
appointed a director of Emerdata Ltd in January 2018. Its other directors included the 
former SCL Group Chairman, Julian Wheatland (who also became the new acting CEO of 
Cambridge Analytica on 11 April, 2018) and the former Chief Data Officer of Cambridge 
Analytica, Alexander Tayler (who took over as acting CEO of Cambridge Analytica on 20 
March, 2018, when Mr Nix was suspended, before resigning on 11 April 2018).
131. On 18 March 2018 (the day after The Guardian first published articles relating to 
Cambridge Analytica), Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer, daughters of Robert Mercer, were 
also appointed directors. Another director of Emerdata is Johnson Chun Shun Ko, 
Deputy Chairman and Executive Director of Frontier Services Group, which is a private 
security firm that operates mostly in Africa. Emerdata is chaired by the US businessman 
Erik Prince, who founded the private military group Blackwater USA. All of Emerdata’s 
subsidiaries went into administration in April 2018, following the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal, and it is uncertain what activities have continued since.
132. Companies House published the ‘Notice of administrators’ proposals’, in respect of 
SCL Elections Ltd., in July 2018. It sets out the circumstances surrounding SCL Election 
Ltd.’s administration. Emerdata is the ultimate holding company and first called in 
the insolvency practitioner, Vincent Green, who then became an administrator. The 
notice highlights the fact that laptops from the SCL offices were not returned, and that 
some laptops returned by the ICO were subsequently stolen. There is also a list of SCL 
Election’s creditors. Emerdata is listed as a creditor/claimant, with the amount of debt 
totalling £6,381,778.05. The administrators propose that the company go into compulsory 
liquidation. We are concerned about what data was remaining on the stolen laptops and 
why Emerdata, the parent company, is the major creditor and is owed over £6.3 million, 
and why SCL USA Inc, a US affiliate, is owed over £1 million.164
133. Over the past month, Facebook has been investing in adverts globally, proclaiming 
the fact that “Fake accounts are not our friends.” Yet the serious failings in the 
company’s operations that resulted in data manipulation, resulting in misinformation 
and disinformation, have occurred again. Over four months after Facebook suspended 
Cambridge Analytica for its alleged data harvesting, Facebook suspended another 
161 SCL Group - companies and shareholders, May 2018
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company, Crimson Hexagon—which has direct contracts with the US government 
and Kremlin-connected Russian organisations—for allegedly carrying out the same 
offence.
134. We are concerned about the administrators’ proposals in connection with SCL 
Elections Ltd, as listed in Companies House, and the fact that Emerdata Ltd is listed 
as the ultimate parent company of SCL Elections Ltd, and is the major creditor and 
owed over £6.3 million. The proposals also describe laptops from the SCL Elections Ltd 
offices being stolen, and laptops returned by the ICO, following its investigations, also 
being stolen. We recommend that the National Crime Agency, if it is not already, should 
investigate the connections between the company SCL Elections Ltd and Emerdata Ltd.
135. The allegations of data harvesting revealed the extent of data misuse, made 
possible by Cambridge University’s Dr Kogan and facilitated by Facebook, GSR, 
and manipulated into micro-targeting Cambridge Analytica and its associated 
companies, through AIQ. The SCL Group and associated companies have gone into 
administration, but other companies are carrying out very similar work. Many of the 
individuals involved in SCL and Cambridge Analytica appear to have moved on to 
new corporate vehicles. Cambridge Analytica is currently being investigated by the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) (and, as a leading academic institution, 
Cambridge University also has questions to answer from this affair about the activities 
of Dr Kogan).
136. We invited Alexander Nix twice to give evidence; both times he was evasive in his 
answers and the standard of his answers fell well below those expected from a CEO of 
an organisation. His initial evidence concerning GSR was not the whole truth. There 
is a public interest in getting to the heart of what happened, and Alexander Nix must 
take responsibility for failing to provide the full picture of events, for whatever reason. 
With respect to GSR, he misled us. We will give a final verdict on Mr Nix’s evidence 
when we complete the inquiry.
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4 Political campaigning
137. It is important to recognise the role that social media plays in encouraging political 
debate. However, the ability of social media companies to target content to individuals, 
and in private, is new. This creates new issues in relation to the regulation of elections, 
including the nature of content and the cost of dissemination, both of which have in the 
past been strictly controlled.
138. The importance of social media has been recognised by businesses and campaigners 
at a much faster rate than by legislators and regulators. This has resulted in candidates 
using social media to secure elections and win votes without the regulatory framework or 
laws to govern modern elections. Businesses such as SCL and Cambridge Analytica have 
exploited this freedom, using social media to persuade candidates that targeting voters 
individually can have a much bigger impact than traditional untargeted advertising.
What is a political advert?
139. Facebook told us that in June 2018 that they had no way of categorising which adverts 
could be classified as political:
Our systems do not have a perfect or reliable way to classify the category 
that advertisements (which are developed and distributed by third-parties 
on our platform) fall in, whether it is political or housing or educational or 
otherwise. We are heavily investing in advanced technologies and machine 
learning to better assess advertisements that fall into specific categories 
(like political and issues adverts) so we can identify and enforce policies and 
tools that may apply […] In addition, issue-based advertising is particularly 
difficult to define at a global scale as there is no universal definition of a 
political issue advert and this concept varies by culture and geography. We 
are continuing to refine our definition of this in collaboration with external 
stakeholders in anticipation of rolling out our transparency tools in the 
UK.165
140. The Electoral Commission’s recently published report describes the nature of ‘dark 
ads’: “Only the voter, the campaigner and the platform know who has been targeted with 
which messages. Only the company and campaigner know why a voter was targeted and 
how much was spent on a particular campaign. This is why the term ‘dark ads’ has been 
used to describe micro-targeting, although it is perfectly legal”.166
141. Some organisations such as the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) support 
creating a central public register of online political adverts, rather than leaving it to the 
social media companies themselves. The IPA’s written evidence calls for a total ban on 
micro-targeting political advertising online, with a minimum limit on the number of 
voters who are sent individual political messages, which would go some way to promote a 
standard line for politicians to follow.167 While it might be difficult to advocate a total ban 
on micro-targeting political advertising online, a preferable alternative could be to limit 
the amount of ‘lookalike micro-targeting’, where people with similar views and opinions 
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to core voters are also targeted.168 Micro-targeting, when carried out in a transparent 
manner, can be a useful political tool. Christopher Wylie told us that it can and should 
be done in an ethical way “that respects the consent of people, that is transparent so that 
people are aware that you are sending them a political message or a commercial message, 
and why it is that they are being sent it”.169
142. We recommend that the Government look at ways in which the UK law defines 
digital campaigning. This should include online adverts that use political terminology 
that are not sponsored by a specific political party. There should be a public register 
for political advertising, requiring all political advertising work to be listed for public 
display so that, even if work is not requiring regulation, it is accountable, clear, and 
transparent for all to see. There should be a ban on micro-targeted political advertising 
to lookalikes online, and a minimum limit for the number of voters sent individual 
political messages should be agreed, at a national level.
143. We reiterate our support for the Cairncross Review and will engage with the 
consultation in the coming months. In particular, we hope that Frances Cairncross will 
give due weight to the role of digital advertising in elections, and will make concrete 
recommendations about how clearer rules can be introduced to ensure fairness and 
transparency.
144. The Government should investigate ways in which to enforce transparency 
requirements on tech companies, to ensure that paid-for political advertising data 
on social media platforms, particularly in relation to political adverts, are publicly 
accessible, are clear and easily searchable, and identify the source, explaining who 
uploaded it, who sponsored it, and its country of origin. This information should be 
imprinted into the content, or included in a banner at the top of the content. Such 
transparency would also enable members of the public to understand the behaviour 
and intent of the content providers, and it would also enable interested academics and 
organisations to conduct analyses and to highlight trends.
145. Tech companies must also address the issue of shell corporations and other 
professional attempts to hide identity in advert purchasing, especially around 
election advertising. There should be full disclosure of targeting used as part of advert 
transparency. The Government should explore ways of regulating on the use of external 
targeting on social media platforms, such as Facebook’s Custom Audiences. We expect 
to see the detail of how this will be achieved in its White Paper later this year.
Electoral questions concerning the EU Referendum
Co-ordinated campaigns
146. Currently, the cost of campaigns is regulated strictly with defined legal limits. In the 
EU Referendum, campaigns were permitted to work together on joint campaigns for a 
particular outcome. However, the nature of the joint work determined how it applied to 
spending limits: any spending on a joint campaign counted towards the limits for each 
campaigner involved; and where spending was on a joint campaign with a designated 
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lead campaigner, all spending counted towards the spending limit of the designated lead 
campaigner only.170 In other words, if campaigns were co-ordinated, then the cost of co-
ordinated campaigns would be accumulated when assessing campaign limits.
147. Vote Leave (as the designated lead ‘Leave’ group) had a permitted expenditure limit 
of £7 million during the Referendum campaign. As we stated in our Special Report of June 
2018, Vote Leave was under investigation by the Electoral Commission, over whether it 
breached this limit by making a £675,315 payment to another campaign group, BeLeave.171 
These revelations came from both Christopher Wylie, in his evidence to the Committee, 
and from another whistleblower, Shahmir Sanni, who worked with Vote Leave.172 The 
£675,315 payment was registered with the Electoral Commission as a donation from 
Vote Leave to Darren Grimes, the founder of BeLeave.173 Some witnesses and outside 
commentators raised questions about the extent to which it was a genuine donation.174
148. The Electoral Commission published the conclusions of its investigation into the 
campaign spending of Vote Leave and other campaign groups on 17 July 2018. The 
findings show that:
• Vote Leave and Darren Grimes, the founder of the BeLeave campaign group, 
broke electoral law;
• there was significant evidence of joint working between the lead campaign, Vote 
Leave, and BeLeave;
• BeLeave spent more than £675,000 with AIQ, under a common plan with 
Vote Leave, which should have been declared by Vote Leave. This extra money 
resulted in Vote Leave exceeding its legal spending limit of £7 million by almost 
£500,000;
• Vote Leave also returned an incomplete and inaccurate spending report, with 
nearly £234,501 reported incorrectly, and invoices missing for £12,849,99 of 
spending.175
149. As a result of these findings, The Electoral Commission has referred David Halsall, 
the responsible person for Vote Leave, and Darren Grimes to the Metropolitan Police, 
for the false declaration of campaign spending.176 As we have previously said, Dominic 
Cummings, the campaign director of Vote Leave, refused to appear before our Committee. 
Likewise, the Electoral Commission wrote that “Vote Leave declined to be interviewed. 
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Its lack of co-operation is reflected in the penalties”. The level of fines are £61,000 for Vote 
Leave, £20,000 for Darren Grimes, and £250 for Veterans for Britain (for inaccurately 
reporting a donation it received from Vote Leave.)
150. As we also highlighted in our Special Report, evidence to the Committee from 
Facebook showed that BeLeave used AggregateIQ datasets covering the “exact same 
audiences”.177 AIQ had a working relationship with SCL/Cambridge Analytica, focused on 
the use of data in campaigns. AIQ had links with Vote Leave and other Brexit campaigns, 
including Be Leave, Veterans for Britain and the DUP and all used the company in 
the short period immediately prior to the EU Referendum. We believe that the precise 
nature of the co-ordination between the different organisations and campaigns should be 
investigated further to establish if the law concerning spending limits and data protection 
was observed.
Leave.EU and data from Eldon Insurance allegedly used for campaigning 
work
151. Insurance companies have access to detailed personal information about their 
customers. Arron Banks described Leave.EU’s method of campaigning, by using the 
micro-targeting of individual voters:
My experience of social media is it is a firestorm that, just like a bush fire, 
it blows over the thing. Our skill was creating bush fires and then putting a 
big fan on and making the fan blow. […] the immigration issue was the one 
that set the wild fires burning.178
152. The question that then arises is how did Leave.EU acquire data to set “wild fires 
burning” on the immigration issue? We heard evidence from various witnesses and from 
written statements that, during the Referendum campaign, Leave.EU used insurance data 
for such micro-targeting of voters, data from Arron Banks’ company, Eldon Insurance 
Services Ltd. Arron Banks described the way Leave.EU carried out psychological profiling, 
and told us that “insurance is all about how you target your product to the person you 
want to target to”:179
The three things that were of interest to me were: obviously, the Referendum 
campaign, my insurance business—could they offer services that were 
along those sorts of lines?—and thirdly, with the UKIP hat on, would it 
be a useful messaging tool for UKIP? I can see why you would think there 
would be a conflict, but there really wasn’t.180
153. Paul-Olivier Dehaye, founder of PersonalDataIO, told us that Leave.EU mailings had 
had insurance adverts for one of Arron Banks’ companies at the bottom of the mailings.181 
Evidence submitted to the inquiry recorded Andy Wigmore, Director of Communications 
for the Leave.EU campaign, in conversation with Dr Emma Briant, Senior Lecturer at Essex 
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University, explaining that the insurance companies’ actuaries used data to determine 
which 12 UK regions Nigel Farage, the then leader of the UKIP, should visit during the 
campaign.
154. Andy Wigmore described in the taped conversations with Dr Emma Briant the power 
of using emotion, rather than facts, which “created a wave of hatred and racism and all 
this right movement, empowering all those things”. He spoke of the Nazis’ propaganda 
strategy: “If you take away all the hideous horror […] it was very clear, the way they 
managed to do what they did. In its pure marketing sense. […] You can see the logic of 
how they presented things and the imagery, everything from that”.182
155. However, when Andy Wigmore gave evidence to the Committee and was asked 
about the recorded conversation with Dr. Briant, his reference to actuaries using data 
to locate the regions that Mr. Farage should visit, and whether the work of the actuaries 
was recorded in Leave.EU’s spending returns, Andy Wigmore replied, “No, I was wrong. 
I apologise because that was completely misinterpreted and that was incorrect”.183 In the 
ICO’s interim report on their investigation into data harvesting, they made reference to 
these allegations of customer data from Eldon Insurance Services being shared with Leave.
EU, and then used for political campaign purposes during the EU Referendum. This is 
contrary to the first and second data protection principles under the Data Protection Act 
1998.184
156. The ICO’s current investigation is also looking into this issue of whether Eldon 
Insurance Ltd’s call centre staff used customer databases to make calls on behalf of 
Leave.EU. This would be in contravention of the Privacy and Electronic Communication 
Regulations 2003.185 Brittany Kaiser told us that she visited the Eldon Insurance and 
Leave.EU headquarters, “which was in the same building with the same staff. When a 
senior data scientist and I spent time with their phone bank I was told by the people using 
the phone bank that the individuals they were calling were from the insurance database”, 
to which Arron Banks responded, “A flat lie”.186 Yet on 25 January 2016, a French news 
documentary showed Arron Banks’ insurance call centre employees working at the call 
centre for Leave.EU, with Liz Bilney, on tape, confirming this.187
157. The ICO is also investigating whether Eldon Insurance Services Ltd transferred 
its insurance customer data to the USA, specifically to the University of Mississippi, 
which would be in contravention of the eighth data protection principle, under the Data 
Protection Act 1998. A UK resident, Kyle Taylor, has filed a law suit in Mississippi to 
determine whether UK data was transferred to Mississippi. The ICO’s line of inquiry “is 
ongoing”.188
158. Determining whether there was collusion between (technically separate) campaigns 
in the EU Referendum, in breach of rules on spending limits, has been a matter primarily 
for the Election Commission, which has now reported its highly critical findings into 
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the activities of Vote Leave, Darren Grimes and BeLeave.189 Determining whether data 
protection law was breached by any use of shared datasets by BeLeave and AIQ is similarly 
a matter for the Information Commissioner and the police. We look forward to the ICO’s 
findings, on which we may wish to comment further in our second Report later this year. 
The Electoral Commission’s report has vindicated evidence given to the Committee about 
the breaching of spending limits, and we look forward to the ICO’s final findings.190
159. Data sets allegedly enabled Leave.EU to push their message to groups of people 
that they might not otherwise have had information about. This evidence informed 
our inquiry, backing up concerns that data is being harvested and utilised from 
many people unwittingly and used for purposes of which they may not be aware. It 
is alleged that Leave.EU obtained data used during the Referendum from insurance 
data from companies owned by Arron Banks. The Information Commissioner’s Office 
is investigating both the alleged misuse of customer data from Arron Banks’ Eldon 
Insurance Services Ltd and the misuse of that data by the call centre staff, to make 
calls on behalf of Leave.EU. These are extremely serious allegations. We look forward 
to hearing the final results of the ICO’s investigations, when it reports in October 2018.
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5 Russian influence in political campaigns
Introduction
160. The speed of technological development has coincided with a crisis of confidence 
in institutions and the media in the West. There is a global phenomenon of foreign 
countries wanting to influence public opinion through disinformation. A report from 
the University of Oxford published in July 2018 identified evidence of formally-organised 
social media manipulation campaigns in 48 countries, up from 28 countries last year.191 
The evidence led us to the role of Russia specifically, in supporting organisations that 
create and disseminate disinformation, false and hyper-partisan content, with the purpose 
of undermining public confidence and of destabilising democratic states. This activity we 
are describing as ‘disinformation’ and it is an active threat.
161. The Committee heard evidence of a co-ordinated, long-standing campaign by the 
Russian Government to influence UK elections and referenda, and similar evidence of 
foreign interference is being investigated by the US Congress in respect of the 2016 US 
Presidential Election. Thanks to these hearings we know that, during the Presidential 
Election, the Russians ran over 3,000 adverts on Facebook and Instagram to promote 120 
Facebook pages in a campaign that reached 126 million Americans. In further evidence 
from Facebook given to our Committee, we know that the Russians used sophisticated 
targeting techniques and created customized audiences to amplify extreme voices in the 
campaign, particular those on sensitive topics such as race relations and immigration.192
162. Disinformation is an unconventional warfare, using technology to disrupt, to 
magnify, and to distort.193 According to research from 89up, the communications agency, 
Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik published 261 media articles on the EU Referendum, with 
an anti-EU sentiment, between 1 January 2016 and 23 June 2016. Their report also showed 
that RT and Sputnik had more reach on Twitter for anti-EU content than either Vote 
Leave or Leave.EU, during the Referendum campaign.194 A joint research project by the 
Universities of Swansea and of Berkeley, at the University of California, also identified 
156,252 Russian accounts tweeting about #Brexit and that they posted over 45,000 Brexit 
messages in the last 48 hours of the campaign.195
163. In the context of this inquiry, we first learnt about the enormity of the problem 
when we visited New York in February 2018, and heard from Clint Watts, senior fellow 
at the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, George Washington University, about 
the prevalence of disinformation, perpetrated by Russia Today and Sputnik News, and 
disseminated through pro-Russia accounts on Twitter and Facebook.196 Back at home, 
Bill Browder, CEO and co-founder of Hermitage Capital Management, told us that “the 
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purpose of Russian disinformation and Russian propaganda is to plant a seed of doubt in 
everybody’s mind. If they can create that kind of confusion, they have accomplished their 
objectives”.197 Edward Lucas, writer and security-policy expert, described the power of 
Russia to influence, even though Russia is weaker economically:
It is true that Russia is a lot weaker than the West. Its population is about 
one-seventh of ours. Its GDP is about one-fourteenth. But it still has the 
capacity to do us harm. It poses a military threat in the Baltic states, 
where geography and NATO’s weaknesses make it hard to muster a strong 
conventional defence. It has a proven ability to confuse, distract and distort 
decision-making, both by targeted attacks on elites, and exerting broader 
influence on public opinion.198
164. This chapter will study the extent of Russian interference in UK politics, specifically 
focussing on the EU Referendum of 2016. We will also comment on the Catalonia 
Referendum of 2017, and the use that Russia makes of tech companies, specifically 
Facebook.
Use of the data obtained by Aleksandr Kogan in Russia
165. Jeff Silvester, from AIQ, confirmed to us that there was an 80% overlap in terms 
of common members of audiences that had been used in campaigns run by both SCL/
Cambridge Analytica and by AIQ. He confirmed that during the presidential primaries, 
AIQ advertised, using specific custom audiences with names and email addresses, saying 
“It is very possible and likely that that information came in, but whether it came directly 
from the campaign or from SCL I do not know”.199 These datasets were created using 
Ripon, and “the information that was fed into Ripon once the campaign started was 
the typical type: who has been contacted and said they would support the campaign”.200 
Aleksandr Kogan was supplying information to go into the system to help targeting those 
adverts.201
166. Aleksandr Kogan told us that he worked at the University of St Petersburg, Russia, in 
the summer of 2013.202 As a result of that initial work, Dr Kogan was involved in a research 
group at the same university, studying the issue of cyber-bullying, between 2014 and 2016. 
Dr Kogan carried out this work at the same time as he was working with Cambridge 
Analytica.203 When asked about the financing of the research group, Dr Kogan told us he 
thought that the Russian Government gave a block grant to the university. When asked 
about whether a research paper was published, he told us “I truly don’t know the exact 
details of that project. I don’t know the final results. The methodology I loosely understand 
and remember. Just keep in mind I was a name on a grant rather than an active participant 
and collaborator on this”.204
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167. Dr Kogan gave evidence to us in April 2018. Since that time, the ICO has been 
investigating Dr Kogan and his data. The Information Commissioner, Elizabeth Denham, 
and her deputy recently met with law enforcement agencies in the US. The Information 
Commissioner’s deputy, James Dipple-Johnstone, confirmed that “some of the systems 
linked to the investigation were accessed from IP addresses that resolve to Russia and 
other areas of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)”.205 It is of concern that 
people in Russia could have benefitted from the work that Dr Kogan carried out in the 
UK, in connection with his work for Cambridge Analytica. We look forward to reading 
the ICO’s findings on this issue in due course.
The role of social media companies in disseminating Russian disinformation
168. Throughout this inquiry, from October 2017 to June 2018, we attempted to gain 
information from Facebook about the extent of Russian interference in UK political 
campaigns. Time and again, Facebook chose to avoid answering our written and oral 
questions, to the point of obfuscation.
169. Facebook finally agreed, in January 2018, to expand its US investigation into alleged 
Russian interference in the EU Referendum. However, it downplayed the extent of the 
problem, and told us that the St Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) had 
bought only three adverts for $0.97 in the days before the Brexit vote.206 This did not 
include unpaid posts, and Facebook did not broaden its investigation beyond those IRA 
‘troll farms’ identified during the US presidential election investigation.
170. According to evidence that Facebook submitted to Congress, and later released 
publicly, Russian anti-immigrant adverts were placed in October 2015 targeting the UK, 
as well as Germany and France. These amounted to 5,514.85 roubles (around £66).207 We 
asked Facebook to confirm the total amount of political advertising paid for by Russian 
agencies targeting Facebook users in the UK since October 2015, to date, and it replied 
with the following statement, in June 2018:
As we have previously reported to the Committee, we have not found any 
systematic targeting of the UK by the IRA in the Referendum period (15 April 
to 23 June 2016), only the minimal activity we reported to the Committee 
already. Looking further back over the activity of the IRA accounts from 
as early as January 2015 (including the period of over a year before the 
start of the regulated referendum period), the total spend on impressions 
delivered to the UK is approximately $463. This is inclusive of all of the 
adverts released by the US Congress last month. The $1 spend we previously 
reported reflects the amount spent during the regulated referendum period 
by the IRA which is the time period which the Election Commission asked 
us to investigate.208
171. When we heard from Facebook in Washington D.C., Simon Milner, the then Policy 
Director UK, Middle East and Africa, Facebook, said that: “Unlike the US election, we have 
still not been furnished with any intelligence reports from the UK authorities to suggest 
205 Elizabeth Denham: data crimes are real crimes, Carole Cadwalladr, The Observer, 15 July 2018
206 Letter from Simon Milner to Damian Collins, 20 December 2017, not published
207 Letter from Rebecca Stimson to Damian Collins, 8 June 2018
208 Letter from Rebecca Stimson to Damian Collins, 8 June 2018
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that there was direct Russian interference using Facebook in the Brexit Referendum”.209 
However, it was pressure from the US Senate, and not specific US intelligence staff, that 
made Facebook do its research into the US election.210 We deem Mr Milner’s comments 
to the Committee to have been disingenuous and typical of Facebook’s handling of our 
questions.
172. There has been a continual reluctance on the part of Facebook to conduct its own 
research on whether its organisation has been used by Russia to influence others. Facebook 
knows its system better than anyone else, and should not be passively reacting to outside 
concerns before they carry out their own research and take action.
173. In January 2018, the Prime Minister, Rt Hon Theresa May MP, announced the 
establishment of a dedicated national security communications unit, to be charged with 
combating fake news and disinformation by state actors and by others.211 This followed 
her speech a few months earlier, when she accused Russia of meddling in elections and 
planting fake news, in an attempt to ‘weaponise information’ and sow discord in the West.212
174. When we took evidence from the then Secretary of State for DCMS in March, Rt Hon 
Matt Hancock MP, he accepted that Russia had been involved in directing disinformation 
at countries including the UK.213 He said that tackling the “multiple threats” of 
disinformation and fake news “is incredibly important to safeguarding our democracy,” 
and, indeed, was “the No. 1 issue faced by our media.”214
175. Over and above the Review, the then Secretary of State said that he was “actively 
waiting for [the DCMS Committee’s] report”. He did not want to “rule out legislative 
options to insist on the transparency of platforms.” While he detected a “noticeable” 
improvement in the level of engagement from the big social media companies over the past 
six months, there was “a lot more to do.”215 He said that the Government was exploring 
a range of ideas, including the option of tightening existing rules to tackle illegal content 
online, and working under the Digital Charter with publishers, tech companies, civil 
society and others to establish a new framework that protects user’ rights.216
176. In November 2017, the Prime Minister accused Russia of meddling in elections and 
planting ‘fake news’ in an attempt to ‘weaponise information’ and sow discord in the 
West. It is clear from comments made by the then Secretary of State in evidence to us 
that he shares her concerns. However, there is a disconnect between the Government’s 
expressed concerns about foreign interference in elections, and tech companies 
intractability in recognising the issue. We would anticipate that this issue will be 
addressed, with possible plans of action, in the White Paper this Autumn.
209 Q369
210 Chair, Q377. The information was obtained during a private meeting, when the Committee was in Washington 
D.C.
211 The Unit is cross-Government but sits within the Cabinet Office. Domestic disinformation and the role of digital 
and digital policy, and policy towards the big digital companies and the lead for interactions with those, sit in 
DCMS’ Digital and Tech Policy Directorate.
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Leave.EU, Arron Banks, and Russia
177. Our inquiry into Russian interference broadened even further when we were 
contacted by three different individuals, with information surrounding email exchanges 
between Arron Banks and representatives from the Russian Embassy in London.217 The 
emails describe multiple meetings between Arron Banks, Andy Wigmore and Russian 
officials, including the Russian Ambassador to the UK, Alexander Yakovenko, involving 
discussions around gold and diamond acquisitions, the passing of confidential documents, 
and the exchange of information surrounding the EU Referendum. These meetings, so far 
as we are aware, began in the period from November 2015, immediately prior to the EU 
Referendum.
178. In these emails, Mr. Banks talked of briefing the Ambassador about the Referendum, 
and that there was a lot of interest about it in America.218 He met with the Ambassador, 
Mr. Yakovenko, and wrote afterward that “I’m very bullish on gold so keen to have a look”.219 
In January 2016, Andrew Umbers, chairman of Oakwell Capital Partners, a marketing 
company to the sports and media tech industry,220 wrote to Siman Povarenkin, a Russian 
businessman with a tier one visa, suggesting a meeting with “the appropriate Sberbank 
decision maker” in Moscow, to discuss co-operation with individuals at Sberbank, the 
state-owned bank that, according to the email, are the “major lenders to all six Russian 
gold companies.”221 Arron Banks and Andy Wigmore were copied into this email. The 
emails that we have seen cover different areas, including Alrosa, the Russian diamond 
monopoly, “touted as one of the companies which could be privatised.”222
179. Another email links Arron Banks with Alexander Nekrassov, a former Kremlin and 
government adviser:
I have been in touch with Alexander Nekrassov and he is willing to help 
us from any angle in the Leave campaign. I realise he is a controversial, 
outspoken person and that there may be some clash of personalities. 
However, if managed well, he could be a valuable asset to the campaign.223
180. Mr Nekrassov is also Director of Financial Services of New Century Media. New 
Century Media’s Chairman is David Burnside, who was previously a Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) MP and who has had close connections with Vincent Tchenguiz, who himself 
used to be the largest shareholder in SCL.224
181. Another email from Arron Banks states: “OK, so there are 11,425 emails that have 
been filtered from the 43,000. I would suggest that half of these are irrelevant but the 
main searches for subjects and people are all here—I have checked”.225 We asked Andy 
Wigmore if, in addition to arranging social meetings for Arron Banks with the Russian 
Embassy in London, he sent documents to the Russian Embassy. In particular, we asked 
217 These contacts occurred at the same time as The Sunday Times and The Observer published articles surrounding 
Russian contact with Arron Banks and Andy Wigmore, in June 2018.
218 12 October 2015 email, not published.
219 17 November 2015 email, not published.
220 Oakwell Capital Partners website, accessed 7 July 2018.
221 18 January 2016 email, from Andrew Umbers to Siman Povarenkin, Sergey Kuznetsov, Andy Wigmore, Arron 
Banks, not published.
222 Email from Vick van den Brul to Andy Wigmore, 2 February 2016, not published.
223 Email, date unknown, labelled, “Very strange email chain”, not published
224 Ibid.
225 Email from Andy Wigmore to Isabel Oakeshott and others, 24 August 2016
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whether he had contacted the Russian Embassy about George Cottrell, a former UKIP 
fundraiser and adviser to Nigel Farage. He denied doing this.226 However, an email, sent 
by him, has been made public, which has six attachments, including FBI documents and 
the George Cottrell indictment.227
182. When asked about the contents of some of these emails that state that Arron Banks 
was in Russia in 2016, Mr Banks showed the Committee two Russian visas, photocopied 
from his two passports, one dated 22 October 2014 and one dated 13 March 2015, and 
said, “The Sunday Times article that said I travelled to Moscow, I have fairly definitive 
proof here that I did not and there we are”.228 He told us that he did not have a second 
passport.229
183. At the time of the email exchanges in 2016, Andy Wigmore had told reporters that 
Arron Banks was in Russia, but he swept this aside when giving evidence to us: “I can 
remember teasing many journalists when they asked, ‘Where is Arron?’ I would often 
say, ‘He’s in Moscow. He’s in Russia.’”230 Mr Wigmore said that information “had just 
come out about Arron being an agent from a document that is called the Atlantic Council 
document accusing him of being absolutely all of those things. We teased people about 
it”.231
184. The document to which Mr. Wigmore was referring was the Atlantic Council’s 
“The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses” which claims that the Kremlin used politicians, experts, 
and individuals who had expressed support for the Kremlin’s action as Trojan horses, 
to destabilise European politics, and referred specifically to UKIP campaigners working 
with the Leave.EU and Grassroots Out campaigns.232 However, the Atlantic Council 
document was published on 15 November 2016, a date after the email exchanges to which 
Mr. Wigmore referred. Mr. Wigmore told us, “My job is to be provocative. That is my job. 
I am trying to give you—I have this sense of humour.233 […] My job is to spin”.234
185. Arron Banks is, reportedly, the largest individual donor in UK political history. 
As far as we understand, he met with the Russian Ambassador, for the first time, in the 
run up to the EU Referendum. Evidence discloses that he discussed business ventures 
within Russia and beyond, and other financial ventures, in a series of meetings with 
Russian Embassy staff. Arron Banks and Andy Wigmore have misled the Committee 
on the number of meetings that took place with the Russian Embassy and walked out 
of the Committee’s evidence session to avoid scrutiny of the content of the discussions 
with the Russian Embassy.
186. From the emails that we have seen, it is evident that Arron Banks had many 
meetings with Russian officials, including the Russian Ambassador, Alexander 
Yakovenko, between 2015 and 2017. The meetings involved discussions about business 
deals involving Alrosa, the Russian diamond monopoly, the purchase of gold mines, 
226 Email from Andy Wigmore to Sergey Fedichkin, Russian Embassy, 20 August 2016
227 George Cottrell was arrested in July 2016 while visiting the US by the FBI and was indicted on 21 counts for 
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funded by Sberbank, the Russian-state bank, and the transferring of confidential 
documents to Russian officials. Mr. Banks seemed to want to hide the extent of his 
contacts with Russia, while his spokesman Andy Wigmore’s statements have been 
unreliable—by his own admission—and cannot be taken at face value. Mr Wigmore 
is a self-confessed liar and, as a result, little significance can be attached to anything 
that he says. It is unclear whether Mr. Banks profited from business deals arising from 
meetings arranged by Russian officials. We understand that the National Crime Agency 
(NCA) is investigating these matters. We believe that they should be given full access to 
any relevant information that will aid their inquiry.
Foreign investment in the EU Referendum
Arron Banks and his own donations
187. Arron Banks is, to date, the person who has given the largest donation to a political 
campaign in British history, reported to be £8.4 million.235 When questioned by us in June 
2018, Mr. Banks could not give a clear answer about where the money for his donations to 
support the different Leave campaigns came from. Previously, in April 2018, Mr Wigmore 
had reported that the sale of NewLaw Legal in 2014 had generated Mr Banks’ donation for 
the Referendum, yet allegedly he was not a shareholder or a director at the time (although 
Mr Banks insisted he was a shareholder at the time of the sale).236
188. There have been persistent questions over the extent of Mr Banks’ wealth. Arron 
Banks refused to answer the question over the solvency of the Southern Rock Insurance 
Company, which he owns.237 Alan Kentish, another Brexit-connected associate, was on 
the board of directors of Southern Rock, as well as being involved in ICS Risk Solutions 
(the parent company of Eldon Insurance, the insurer behind Go Skippy, and owned by 
Arron Banks, and a holding company on the Isle of Man). The day after the Referendum, 
Alan Kentish became a director of ICS.238 STM founded Better for the Country, which 
gave £1.95 million to the umbrella Leave group, Grassroots Out. Better for the Country is 
owned by Arron Banks. A Channel 4 investigation has revealed court documents in South 
Africa that pre-date evidence to our Committee. They relate to Mr Banks seeking contact 
with Russian investors, which suggests he was actively seeking financial support in Russia 
for his mining businesses in southern Africa.239
189. In 2015, STM became the first company in Jersey to be prosecuted for money-
laundering compliance failures. STM was managing operations for Henley & Partners, 
the company involved in foreign campaigns with Cambridge Analytica.240 Previously, 
in 2010, STM had used Henley & Partners to help the Ukrainian politician, Viacheslav 
Suprunenko, apply for a passport in St Kitts and Nevis. He was at the time wanted by 
Interpol for assault during an armed robbery to recover documents in a business dispute.241
235 Q3582
236 Qq3627 and 3628
237 Qq3554–3561.This has been investigated by the Gibraltar Finance Services Commission.
238 STM Group PLC is a multi-jurisdictional financial services group listed on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. The Board of STM consists of: Robin Ellison (Interim Chairman); Therese 
Neish (CFO); and Malcolm Berryman (NED).
239 https://www.channel4.com/news/exclusive-court-documents-claim-new-arron-banks-links-with-russia
240 See Chapter 6
241 https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/brexitinc/marcus-leroux-leigh-baldwin/brexit-s-offshore-secrets-0
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190. The Electoral Commission is carrying out an investigation to trace the source of the 
money that Arron Banks donated to Leave.EU and Better for the Country.242
191. Arron Banks is believed to have donated £8.4 million to the Leave campaign, the 
largest political donation in British politics, but it is unclear from where he obtained that 
amount of money. He failed to satisfy us that his own donations had, in fact, come from 
sources within the UK. At the same time, we have evidence of Mr. Banks’ discussions 
with Russian Embassy contacts, including the Russian Ambassador, over potential 
gold and diamond deals, and the passing of confidential information by Mr Banks. The 
Electoral Commission should pursue investigations into donations that Arron Banks 
made to the Leave campaign, to verify that the money was not sourced from abroad. 
Should there be any doubt, the matter should be referred to the NCA. The Electoral 
Commission should come forward with proposals for more stringent requirements for 
major donors to demonstrate the source of their donations.
192. The Electoral Commission has recommended that there should be a change in the 
rules covering political spending, so that limits are put on the amount of money an 
individual can donate. We agree with this recommendation, and urge the Government 
to take this proposal on board.
Catalonia Referendum
193. An example of alleged Russian interference in other countries’ affairs is provided 
by the Catalan independence Referendum. This was held on 1 October 2017, having 
been passed by the Parliament of Catalonia and the Law on the Referendum on Self-
determination of Catalonia. It was declared illegal on 7 September 2017 and suspended 
by the Constitutional Court of Spain, declaring it a breach of the Spanish Constitution of 
1978.243
194. Francisco de Borja Lasheras told us about the context in which alleged Russian 
interference occurred:
In the case of Catalonia, we saw a mixture of things that were right—that 
there were instances of police violence—and of fake news, biased reporting 
and a misleading account. With all of those patterns, we cannot attribute 
all of that to Russia; that would just not be correct. It is important to 
distinguish between proper fake news—there were cases of fake news—and 
biased reporting. In the case of the Russian-affiliated outlets, you see a little 
bit of both: you see instances of balanced reporting with instances of biased 
reporting and fake news.244
195. Information operations should not be studied in isolation; they are part of a complex, 
interrelated group of actions that disseminate confusion and unrest. Francisco de Borja 
Lasheras described the context: “You had democratic rule of law versus the right to 
decide, protest versus the constitutional order, and territorial integrity versus succession. 
242 Digital Campaigning: increasing transparency for voters, The Electoral Commission, June 2018
243 The referendum question was “Do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of a 
republic”, and the ‘yes’ side won with 92.01% voting for independence, and 7.99% voting against, on a turnout 
of 43.03%.
244 Q52
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So it did provide an opening for a democratic crisis that is ongoing and very complex”.245 
Our witnesses talked about the prevalence of up to 70% to 80% of bots that retweet 
disinformation.246 Furthermore, journalists who reported on Russian troll farms were 
attacked verbally and so the established media was undermined by disseminating false 
information purporting to be fact, such as the claim that 900 people had been injured in 
Catalonia, which did not happen.247
196. David Alandete told us about Sputnik’s editor-in-chief, Margarita Simonyan, who 
is close to Putin, and advised that “I would seriously look into RT and Sputnik, what 
information they do and what they cover here in the United Kingdom about all sorts of 
issues because I think it is worth seeing. The State Department in the United States has 
just requested that they register as foreign agents. Twitter has banned them from buying 
advertisements, because they think it is propaganda and not advertisement for commercial 
reasons”.248
197. We heard evidence that showed alleged Russian interference in the Spanish 
Referendum, in October 2017. During the Referendum campaign, Russia provoked 
conflict, through a mixture of misleading information and disinformation, between 
people within Spain, and between Spain and other member states in the EU, and in 
NATO. We heard evidence that showed that Russia had a special interest in discrediting 
the Spanish democratic system, through Russian state affiliated TV organisations 
spreading propaganda that benefitted those wanting independence in Catalonia.
Co-ordination between UK Departments and between countries
198. The UK Government has made Russia a tier 1 national security threat.249 With that 
should come a united Government approach, but Edward Lucas told us that “everybody’s 
treading on everybody else’s toes, and what we have seen so far in Whitehall is that there’s 
been a massive turf war, rather than anything that’s actually dealing seriously with Russia”.250 
The problem has been to treat Russia as an emerging economy, which has “created lobbies 
in this country who are extremely unhappy at the thought of relations with Russia going 
downhill, and you get those lobbies exercising power in all the political powers”.251
199. Six Committees at the House of Commons, including our own, formed the Russian 
Co-ordination Group in April 2018. It comprises of the Chairs (and selected members) 
of Select Committees with an interest in Russia.252 The Group aims to co-ordinate 
Committee work relating to scrutiny of Russian-related activity by sharing knowledge 
about relevant inquiries by Committees. The chair of the Group, Tom Tugendhat MP, said 
about its launch: “We want to produce a system of work that answers the malign influence 
we are seeing in a collective way from Russia.”253
245 Q52
246 David Alandete, Q53
247 David Alandete, Q60; Francisco de Borja Lasheras, Q61
248 Q68
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250 Q888
251 Q888
252 The Select Committees in the Russian Co-ordination group are Defence, Foreign Affairs (who provides the Chair, 
Tom Tugendhat MP, and the Secretary, Bob Seely MP), Treasury, DCMS, JCNSS and Home Affairs. It is anticipated 
that the Intelligence and Security Committee will also be represented, with its involvement subject to the 
necessary restrictions around the confidentiality of its work.
253 The launch was on 20 April 2018.
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200. This type of collaboration should be mirrored in the Government, with cross-
Departmental work. Edward Lucas cites the work carried out in Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, and in Sweden and Finland, where people have been warning the UK since the 
1990s about this emerging threat.254 Departments should be working together, sharing 
data, intelligence and expert knowledge, involving universities, the criminal justice 
system, intelligence agencies, and the financial system.255
201. Representatives of this Committee participated in the inter-parliamentary meeting 
at the Atlantic Council, on 16 July 2018, in Washington D.C., in partnership with the 
Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity. The event brought together US, 
Canadian and EU political representatives, led by Senator Warner and Senator Rubio, 
to discuss Russian interference in democratic elections around the world. We have 
included the recommendations from this meeting in the Annex to this Report. One of the 
recommendations encourages greater sharing of information and best practices between 
countries:
We support greater and sustained transatlantic cooperation, including 
between national governments, NATO, and the European Union, to 
share information on risks, vulnerabilities, and best practices to counter 
interference. Coordination between parliamentarians and open, regular 
dialogue with social media, technology companies, and civil society can 
strengthen these efforts.256
202. We recommend that the UK Government approaches other governments and follows 
the recommendation agreed by US and EU representatives, including representatives 
from this Committee, at the recent inter-parliamentary meeting at the Atlantic Council. 
The Government should share information on risks, vulnerabilities, and best practices 
to counter Russian interference, and co-ordinate between parliamentarians across the 
world. Only by sharing information, resources, and best practice will this Government 
be able to combat Russian interference in our elections. We look forward to a White 
Paper this autumn, and the opportunity for the Government to set out the practical steps 
that it will follow to ensure greater global co-operation to combat Russian interference.
203. Just as six Select Committees have joined forces in an attempt to combat Russian 
influence in our political discourse, so the Government should co-ordinate joint working 
with the different relevant Departments. Those Departments should not be working in 
silos, but should work together, sharing data, intelligence and expert knowledge, to 
counter the emerging threat of Russia, and other malign players.
204. We note that the Mueller Inquiry into Russian interference in the United States 
is ongoing. It would be wrong for Robert Mueller’s investigation to take the lead about 
related issues in the UK. We recommend that the Government makes a statement about 
how many investigations are currently being carried out into Russian interference in 
UK politics and ensures that a co-ordinated structure exists, involving the Electoral 
Commission and the Information Commissioner, as well as other relevant authorities.
254 Edward Lucas, Q889
255 Edward Lucas, Q892
256 Refer to Annex for the full set of recommendations
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6 SCL influence in foreign elections
Introduction
205. The influencing of elections by foreign powers, through the distortion of facts, or by 
the micro-targeting of voters, to persuade them to vote in a certain way, or to suppress 
their desire to vote at all, has been a reoccurring theme throughout this inquiry. This 
chapter will explore the disturbing inter-relation between disinformation and the 
manipulation of election campaigns, concentrating on the work of SCL Elections, and 
associated companies.
General
206. The Committee received evidence about the role of SCL Elections, a company that 
Alexander Nix formed, as an offshoot of SCL Group, in 2011, and its role in foreign 
elections, including its use of misinformation, disinformation and micro-targeting, which 
may have crossed the line into unethical, or even illegal behaviour. A Channel 4 undercover 
investigation, broadcast in March 2018, filmed Mark Turnbull, former Managing Director 
of SCL Elections, and Alexander Nix, the then CEO of Cambridge Analytica, talking 
about using misinformation, dirty tricks and the manipulation of social media to influence 
elections around the world, and boasting of using bribery, honey traps and sex workers 
to discredit politicians and to influence the political outcome of elections in elections in 
several countries.257
207. Mr Turnbull also talked about the manipulation of social media companies, in order 
to distribute negative material on political opponents, done in such a way so as not to be 
identified as the source of the material:
You’re creating social media content that you’re putting out into social 
media and you’re just gently amplifying, by hitting influential people who 
have huge following on Facebook and Twitter, so they retweet, re-post, and 
so this stuff infiltrates the online community and expands, but with no 
brand, so it’s unattributable, untrackable. […] [W]e just put information 
into the bloodstream to the Internet, and then watch is grow, give it a little 
push every now and again, over time, to watch it take shape.258
208. Mark Turnbull described how they “ghosted in and ghosted out” of election 
campaigns.259 In a recorded telephone conversation with the Channel 4 reporter, 
Alexander Nix said that “we do incognito very well indeed, in fact we have many clients 
who never wish to have our relationship with them made publ ic. […] And, we’re used 
to that,  we’re used to operating through different vehicle s, in the shadows, and I look 
forward to building a very long-term and secretive relationship with you”.260
209. When Alexander Nix first gave evidence to us, he described SCL’s political work:
257 Exposed: Undercover secrets of Trump’s data firm, Channel 4 News, March 2018.
258 Exposed: Undercover secrets of Trump’s data firm, Channel 4 News, March 2018.
259 Exposed: Undercover secrets of Trump’s data firm, Channel 4 News, March 2018.
260 Exposed: Undercover secrets of Trump’s data firm, Channel 4 News, March 2018.
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We have been running election campaigns since 1994. We take on a 
number of national elections every year. That could be three, four, five, six, 
seven elections across the world in every single year for prime ministers and 
presidents. That could be in Asia, Latin America, Europe, Africa or beyond. 
[…] We have a political division, but our political division is only, say, 20% 
or 25% of our entire business.261
210. The following election and referenda campaigns were mentioned by Mr. Turnbull 
and Mr. Nix, over the course of the Channel 4 meetings: Kenya, Kenyatta campaign 
2013; Kenya, Kenyatta campaign 2017; Ghana 2013; Mexico; Brazil; Australia; Thailand; 
Malaysia; Indonesia; India; Nigeria; Pakistan; Philippines; Germany; England; Slovakia; 
Czech Republic; and Kosovo.262 Ex-SCL employees have also mentioned: France; Guyana; 
Gambia; Germany; Italy; Kenya; Malaysia; Mongolia; Niger; Nigeria; Peru; St Kitts and 
Nevis; St. Lucia; and Trinidad and Tobago. SCL may also have worked on the Mayoral 
election campaign in Buenos Aires in 2015 for Mauricio Macri, including delivering some 
target audience analysis work.263
211. We were told that, behind much of SCL Elections’ campaigning work was the hidden 
hand of Christian Kalin, Chairman of Henley and Partners, who arranged for investors to 
supply the funding to pay for campaigns, and then organised SCL to write their manifesto 
and oversee the whole campaign process. In exchange, Alexander Nix told us, Henley and 
Partners would gain exclusive passport rights for that country, under a citizenship-by-
investment (CBI) programme.264 Alexander Nix and Christian Kalin have been described 
as having a ‘Faustian pact’.265 With the exclusive passport rights came a government that 
would be conducive to Mr. Kalin and his clients.266
212. Alexander Nix told the Committee that, at times, SCL Elections would undertake 
eight, nine or 10 elections a year, “and we are not limited by geography, so this really 
could be from the Caribbean to Asia to Africa to Europe or everywhere”.267 When asked 
about his involvement in the elections with Mr Kalin, including in St Kitts and Nevis, 
Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Referendum in St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, he responded:
I was familiar with Christian Kalin because he had worked in some of 
the Caribbean islands. I know he used to run a citizen-by-investment 
programme, certainly in St Kitts and possibly the Dominica. I do not know 
about the other countries.268
213. He told us that Mr Kalin “may well have made contributions towards the election 
campaigns, but you would have to talk to him about that. […] [M]y understanding is that 
he may well have financed some of the elections or given contributions towards some 
261 Q735
262 Information from Channel 4.
263 Confidential evidence/meetings with ex-SCL employees.
264 Alexander Nix, Q3381
265 What was it really like to work for Cambridge Analytica, Freddy Gray, Spectator podcast, 4 May 2018
266 How Cambridge Analytica fueled a shady global passport bonanza, Ann Marlowe, 1 July 2018
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of the elections”.269 This chapter will explore the specific examples of misinformation, 
disinformation, and malign manipulation that the SCL Group, SCL Elections, SCL Social, 
and associated companies undertook in certain countries.
St Kitts and Nevis
214. SCL worked on a campaign to win the 2010 general election in St Kitts and Nevis, in 
the Caribbean, and, according to Freddy Gray, of The Spectator:
SCL practised the dirty trick—or ‘counter ops’—that Nix was caught 
bragging about to undercover reporters in [… the] Channel 4 expose. Nix 
was not exaggerating. One of the dirty tricks was a sting operation in St 
Kitts and Nevis. SCL filmed the opposition leader, Lindsay Grant, being 
offered a bribe by an undercover operative posing as a real-estate investor. 
Grant didn’t exactly help himself by accepting the bribe and even suggesting 
which offshore bank accounts the money could be paid into.270
215. According to evidence we received, this sting operation was arranged entirely by SCL, 
with the undercover operative—a temporary SCL employee—being paid around £10,000 
by Alexander Nix, for the work that they had carried out. Alexander Nix told us that 
Christian Kalin had run a citizenship-by investment programme in St. Kitts and Nevis.271
216. When asked to comment on whether the sting on Lindsay Grant, orchestrated and 
filmed by SCL, happened, Mr Nix told us that that was nothing more sinister than the 
undercover reporting that Channel 4 was undertaking itself, and implied that both the 
SCL and Channel 4’s reporting were equivalent in nature. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Channel 4’s investigation was legitimate journalism; SCL’s activities involved 
the offering of a bribe to an Opposition Leader, with the explicit intention of influencing 
an election.272 In the Channel 4 exposé, Mr Nix and Mr Turnbull talked to who they 
thought was a potential client, and voluntarily exposed techniques that they stated were 
standard procedure in the company.
217. Henley & Partners have held the exclusive passport rights for St Kitts and Nevis since 
before 2009. According to the article by Ann Marlowe: “For the bargain price of $150,000, 
approved applicants who donate to the island’s sustainable growth fund can now obtain 
a passport that, as of 2009, allows visa-free travel to over 100 countries, including the UK 
and the 26-nation European Schengen zone”. By 2014, passports had become St Kitts and 
Nevis’ biggest export (St Kitts does not require citizens to live there), with the revenue 
accounting for around 25% of GDP.273 Ann Marlowe wrote:
Many of the passport holders are from countries with unpopular passports 
who may otherwise have trouble obtaining travel visas—think Iran, China, 
Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan. The firms say their well-heeled clients are 
seeking protection against unpredictable situations at home amid an era of 
terrorism fears and economic instability.274
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Trinidad and Tobago
218. Evidence submitted by Christopher Wylie highlighted the fact that SCL was 
influencing the election by disseminating disinformation about the voting preferences of 
young adults, by fabricating content that they said had come from young people, and then 
acting on those views:
Trinidadian elections are affected by the population’s mixed ethnicity: 
political leaders from one group have difficulty in making their messages 
resonate with those outside of it. Working from this 2009 finding, SCL 
designed an ambitious campaign of political graffiti that disseminated 
campaign messages that ostensibly came from the youth. The client party 
was then able to adopt related policies and claim credit for listening to a 
‘united youth’.275
SCL worked on elections in Trinidad and Tobago in 2010, where their main contact for 
organising payments related to the campaign appears to have been the disgraced former 
FIFA executive Jack Warner.
Argentina
219. The Committee saw confidential evidence—a summary of a management meeting at 
SCL Group from 27 May 2015—in relation to an anti-Kirchner276 campaign in Argentina, 
describing “close proximity intelligence gathering efforts” and “information warfare”, 
and the use of “retired Intelligence and Security agency officers from Israel, USA, UK, 
Spain, and Russia”, and the creation of false Facebook and Twitter accounts to support 
the anti-Kirchner campaign.277 When questioned whether SCL Group had worked for 
an opposition party, or some other person interested in influencing politics in Argentina, 
against the Government, Alexander Nix replied, “That would be the appearance of that, 
yes”.278
Malta
220. Henley & Partners has been Malta’s exclusive passport agent since it helped to launch 
its citizenship-by-investment (CBI) programme in 2013. Henley & Partners was granted 
permission to control the selling of citizenship to eligible investors in Malta, at a cost of 
€650,000 per passport. As Malta is in the EU, this was especially valuable.279 We have 
evidence to show that Dr Kalin was meeting representatives from both political sides 
in Malta, with a view to mutually-beneficial arrangements. The evidence also shows 
that Christian Kalin asked SCL to introduce him to Joseph Muscat, the Leader of the 
Opposition at the time, in June 2011, and indicates that SCL had been advising Malta’s 
Labour Party for several years before the 2013 elections.280 It is believed that SCL, or its 
associated companies, worked with the Labour Party there, on the 2013 general election 
campaign in Malta.
275 Background papers submitted by Christopher Wylie
276 Cristina Kirchner was President of Argentina from 2007 to 2015
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221. Daphne Caruana Galizia, the Maltese investigative journalist, was investigating the 
Maltese CBI passport scheme, as well as organised crime in Malta. In October 2017, she 
was assassinated by a car bomb. On her blog, she wrote “The damage caused to Malta by 
the sale of citizenship is unquantifiable. Malta is not St. Kitts & Nevis. It is interlocked 
with the rest of the European Union and has a European economy. […] And the Maltese 
government is the only EU member state government with which they [Henley & Partners] 
have a contract”.281
222. In April 2018, a consortium of 45 journalists from 18 news organisations, including 
The Guardian, The New York Times, Le Monde, and the Times of Malta, published “The 
Daphne Project”, a collaborative effort to complete Caruana Galizia’s investigative work.282 
A week after Daphne Caruana Galizia’s assassination, the Maltese Prime Minister Joseph 
Muscat attended a ‘Global Citizenship’ conference in Dubai, which was hosted by Henley 
& Partners, saying that Malta was ‘open for business’. Recently, Lord Ashcroft extolled the 
virtues of Malta, as the “best destination for ambitious UK firms” to have a post-Brexit 
presence in the EU.283
Nigeria and Black Cube
223. Black Cube, a corporate intelligence organisation, is “a select group of veterans from 
the Israeli elite intelligence units that specialises in tailored solutions to complex business 
and litigation challenges” and claims that “using our unique intelligence methodology, 
Black Cube enhances its clients’ decision making by providing otherwise unobtainable 
information”.284 Mark Turnbull told the Channel 4 news reporter: “We have relationships 
and partnerships with specialist organisations that do that kind of work.” He went on to 
say, “So that […] you know who the opposition is, you know their secrets, you know their 
tactics.”285
224. Alexander Nix later told the Channel 4 reporter: “We use some British companies, 
we use some Israeli companies.” One of the Israeli companies he said that Cambridge 
Analytica used was Black Cube.286 When asked in oral evidence to confirm this, Alexander 
Nix said: “I think in the transcript—because I did read this—he said, “Have you worked 
with Black Cube?” and I replied, “Yes”. I was totally mistaken. We have never worked with 
Black Cube”.287
225. When Brittany Kaiser gave evidence, she denied that she knew the Israeli cyber 
security contractors, but told the Committee that two people “came to the office for 
maybe an hour one day, and plugged something into a computer to show some pieces of 
information that they had obtained from the opposing campaign”.288 Christopher Wylie 
told us that “Black Cube was engaged to hack the now President of Nigeria, Buhari, to get 
access to his medical records and private emails. AIQ worked on that project.”289
281 No wonder Henley & Partners have broken out into a cold sweat, Running Commentary: Daphne Caruana 
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226. We also received an extremely disturbing video from both Brittany Kaiser and 
Christopher Wylie. Mr. Wylie described the video: “people were being dismembered, were 
having their throats cut and bleeding to death in a ditch, being burned alive. There are 
incredibly anti-Islamic and threatening messages portraying Muslims as violent”.290 Jeff 
Silvester, from AIQ, wrote in evidence to us that AIQ were asked by SCL to promote the 
video with online advertising, but AIQ refused.291
227. Furthermore, a promotional case study of international projects includes a section 
on Nigeria, which explains how SCL encouraged potential opposition voters not to vote:
SCL was able to advise that rather than trying to motivate swing voters to 
vote for our clients, a more effective strategy might be to persuade opposition 
voters not to vote at all—an action that could be easily monitored. This 
was achieved by organising anti-election rallies on the day of polling in 
opposition strongholds. These were conducted by local religious figures to 
maximise their appeal especially among the spiritual, rural communities.292
228. Equally worrying is the fact that the SCL Group carried out work “for the British 
Government, the US Government and other allied Governments”,293 which meant that Mr. 
Nix and the SCL Group and associated companies were working for the UK Government, 
alongside working on campaigning work for other countries. Mr. Nix also told us that 
Christian Kalin was working for the UK Government at the same time.294 We published 
a Ministry of Defence approbation of SCL, after SCL provided psychological operations 
training for MOD staff, which revealed that SCL was given classified information about 
operations in Helmand, Afghanistan, as a result of their security clearances.295 Alexander 
Nix explained that SCL “is a company that operates in the government and defence space, 
it acts as a company that has secret clearance”.296
Conclusion
229. Alexander Nix appeared twice before the Committee, in February and in May 
2018. His second appearance was after the Channel 4 undercover report had filmed him 
describing the work that SCL carried out in foreign campaigns: “These are just examples 
of what can be done […] and what has been done”. When we asked about the report, Mr 
Nix told the Committee that he had sullied his own reputation, by “exaggeration and 
hyperbole”, in order to win a client contract: “I alluded to services that we do not make 
and never made as a company. Yes, it was extremely foolish of me”.297 Given the evidence 
that we received through the course of this inquiry, it is hard to believe that Mr Nix’s 
admissions on Channel 4 were as a result of ‘exaggeration and hyperbole’, rather than 
based on his direct experience of overseeing many elections abroad.
230. The work of SCL and its associates in foreign countries involved unethical and 
dangerous work, and we have heard worrying accounts of SCL employees being put in 
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grave danger. Paul Oliver Dehaye described the work that Dan Muresan, an employee 
of SCL, had to do, while employed by SCL: “He was working for Congress, according 
to reports from India, but he was really paid for by an Indian billionaire who wanted 
Congress to lose. He was pretending to work for one party but was really paid underhand 
by someone else”.298
231. We received disturbing evidence, some of which we have published, some of which 
we have not, of activities undertaken by the SCL-linked companies in various political 
campaigns dating from around 2010, including the use of hacking, of disinformation, 
and of voter suppression, and the use of the services of Black Cube, an Israeli private 
intelligence service, whose work allegedly included illegal hacking. We also heard 
of the links between SCL and Christian Kalin of Henley and Partners and their 
involvement in election campaigns, in which Mr Kalin already ran or subsequently 
launched citizenship-by-investment programmes, involving the selling of countries 
passports to investors. SCL’s alleged undermining of democracies in many countries, 
by the active manipulation of the facts and events, was happening alongside work done 
by the SCL Group on behalf of the UK Government, the US Government, and other 
allied governments. We do not have the remit or the capacity to investigate these claims 
ourselves, but we urge the Government to ensure that the National Crime Agency 
thoroughly investigates these allegations.
298 Paul-Olivier Dehaye, Q1374
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7 Digital literacy
232. Throughout the inquiry, we heard about the powerful influencing nature of social 
media and the fact that it is hard to differentiate between what is true, what is misleading, 
and what is false, especially when messages are targeted at an individual level. Children, 
young adults, and adults—all users of digital media—need to be equipped in general with 
sufficient digital literacy, to be able to understand content on the Internet, and to work out 
what is accurate or trustworthy, and what is not. Time and again, we heard people saying 
that “when the service is free, you are the product” and, as the product, individual users 
are continually being manipulated, without their even realising.
233. This chapter will explore how people, especially children and young adults, engage 
with social media, and what can be done to ensure that they understand the digital space, 
and can make informed choices about how they spend their time, how they identify sites 
that they can trust or are safe, how they appraise the content of what they read, and what 
information they share with others.
The need for digital literacy
Why people connect on social media
234. The point of social media is to interact with other people, and to share ideas. Dr 
Caroline Tagg, from the Open University, carried out research that showed that people 
use Facebook to maintain social relationships, and to many people Facebook was not seen 
as a news media site, but “a place where they carry out quite complex maintenance and 
management of their social relationships”.299
235. Within those social relationships, people tend to connect and want to spend time 
with others who share their same views and interests, which is when the spread of 
misinformation can happen so quickly. Professor Lewandowsky, from the University of 
Bristol, told us about an Australian study on climate change:
Only 8% of people were found to completely negate the idea that the climate 
is changing but those 8% thought that their opinion was shared by half 
the population and that was because they were all in this echo chamber 
and talked to each other and felt their opinions confirmed. I think that 
is a novel problem that is inherent to the technology. That people think, 
whatever they think, everybody else thinks the same way.300
236. This dependency and reliance on social media comes with worrying consequences, 
as Tristan Harris told us:
There are many different issues emerging out of the attention economy. 
The externalities range from public health, addiction, culture, children’s 
well-being, mental well-being, loneliness, sovereignty of identity and things 
like that to election democracy, truth, discernment of truth and a shared 
reality, anti-trust and power. There are multiple issues. There are even more, 
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because when you control the minds of people, you control society. How 
people make sense of the world and how they make choices are what ID is, 
and that can affect every aspect of society.301
Content on social media
237. Most users do not understand how the content they read has got there, but accept 
it without question. A significant part of digital literacy is understanding how social 
media works, and how the content that each user reads has appeared, as a result of specific 
algorithms:
If we are talking about news and media literacy curricula, that has to include 
teaching about how to evaluate an algorithm and how to understand how 
what you see on Amazon, Netflix or Facebook has been decided by an 
algorithm, how an algorithm gets developed, how it is created by a certain 
person and how their biases might shape that. That has to be part of the 
teaching that we give to people.302
238. What appears on individuals’ newsfeeds is there either by an algorithm, based on 
their behaviour and profile, or it is targeted at their demographic by paid promotion. 
Indeed, it is common for publishers to pay for their content to be posted so that they can 
reach a wider audience, due to the fact that Facebook, for example, does not recognise or 
seek to categorise good journalism or news over other material.303
239. Once content is on social media, it is hard for people to disregard what they have 
just read. Professor Stephan Lewandowsky told us that there are hundreds of studies have 
shown that “if we try to correct people’s beliefs based on what they have heard they may 
adjust their belief slightly but there is a lot of evidence to suggest that they continue to 
rely on that information nonetheless. […] The cognitive consequences of fake news are 
pervasive”.304
Data on social media
240. When we share information about ourselves on social media, there is a tacit 
understanding that that information will become public. When Alexander Nix first gave 
evidence, in February 2018, he told us that people understand the reciprocity of businesses 
giving an offer in exchange of people’s data through, for example, loyalty cards and that 
“their data is being taken in return to help that brand to drive its marketing. […] People 
are not naïve”.305 However, in the context of the data extraction by Aleksandr Kogan, 
Sandy Parakilas, a former Facebook manager, rightly said that Facebook users “may have 
understood in theory that there were privacy concerns but they did not know how much 
of their data was being sent to developers whom they had no relationship with”.306
241. People also need to be aware of rights they have with regard to how their personal 
data is used, and what to do when they want their data to be removed. Social media 
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companies do not make it easy for their users to control their own data. It is hard to find 
privacy controls, and there is no simple explanation of how users can look after their data 
and their privacy. Facebook’s terms of its data and cookies policy had a large button for 
accepting Facebook’s ‘updated Terms to continue using Facebook’. If the user did not 
want to accept the Terms, they followed a small link ‘see your options’, which let them 
delete the account.
242. The Information Commissioner’s Office is planning to work with the Electoral 
Commission, the Cabinet Office, and political parties to launch a “Your Data Matters” 
campaign, before the next General Election, with the aim “to increase transparency and 
build trust and confidence amongst the electorate on how their personal data is being used 
during political campaigns”.307 We hope that this campaign will be proactive in telling 
people about their own data, and how they should share it, and their rights over their data.
A unified approach to digital literacy
Young people
243. The Education Policy Initiative reports that 95% of 15-year-olds in the UK use social 
media before or after school, and that half of 9 to 16-year-olds use smart phones daily.308 
From an early age, young children are growing up with digital devices. Our education 
system should be equipping children with the necessary tools to live in our digital world, 
so that their mental health, emotional well-being and faculty for critical thinking are 
protected. They need to be aware of the issues surrounding social media, and be aware 
of their actions when interacting with digital arenas. Finding ways to involve parents and 
carers is equally important.309
School curriculum
244. Our schools play a crucial role in helping students to differentiate between fact and 
fiction, and there are various initiatives to tackle the growing issue of the use of social 
media by children and young adults. The PSHE Association recommended that the 
secondary school Personal, Social, Health and Economic (PSHE) curriculum should cover 
the issues that young people are concerned about online, including compulsive use, data 
gathering and body image.310 The Times and The Sunday Times have recently launched a 
media literacy scheme in schools, to help pupils how to spot ‘fake news’. The scheme will 
be available for pupils in secondary schools, colleges and sixth form. The programme is in 
partnership with News UK’s News Academy.311
245. In a letter sent to social media companies in April 2018, the then Secretary of State 
for Health, Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP, warned those companies that they needed to ensure 
the protection of children’s mental health from the dangers of social media, and discussed 
the possibility of introducing legislation for social media platforms, to curb the dangers 
307 Democracy disrupted: Personal information and political influence, ICO, 11 July 2018
308 The Science and Technology Committee launched its current inquiry into the Impact of social media and screen-
use on young people’s health.
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Mayhew, Press Gazette, 28 June 2018.
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of cyber-bullying of young adults.312 California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 will 
establish special protections for children under the age of sixteen, including independent 
reviews, age ratings and other guidance to help children and their adults to navigate the 
world of social media.313
246. We recommend that the Government put forward proposals in its White Paper for 
an educational levy to be raised by social media companies, to finance a comprehensive 
educational framework (developed by charities and non-governmental organisations) 
and based online. Digital literacy should be the fourth pillar of education, alongside 
reading, writing and maths. The DCMS Department should co-ordinate with the 
Department for Education, in highlighting proposals to include digital literacy, as part 
of the Physical, Social, Health and Economic curriculum (PSHE). The social media 
educational levy should be used, in part, by the Government, to finance this additional 
part of the curriculum.
247. There should be a unified public awareness initiative, supported by the Departments 
for DCMS, Health, and Education, with additional information and guidance from the 
Information Commissioner’s Office and the Electoral Commission, and funded in part 
by the tech company levy. Such an initiative would set the context of social media content, 
explain to people what their rights over their data are, within the context of current 
legislation, and set out ways in which people can interact with political campaigning 
on social media. This initiative should be a rolling programme, and not one that occurs 
only before general elections or referenda.
248. The public should be made more aware of their ability to report digital 
campaigning that they think is misleading, or unlawful. We look forward to the work 
that the Electoral Commission is planning, to bring this to the fore.
312 Jeremy Hunt threatens social media with new child-protection laws, BBC, 22 April 2018.
313 California legislative information
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Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction and background
1. The term ‘ fake news’ is bandied around with no clear idea of what it means, or agreed 
definition. The term has taken on a variety of meanings, including a description of 
any statement that is not liked or agreed with by the reader. We recommend that 
the Government rejects the term ‘ fake news’, and instead puts forward an agreed 
definition of the words ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’. With such a shared 
definition, and clear guidelines for companies, organisations, and the Government to 
follow, there will be a shared consistency of meaning across the platforms, which can 
be used as the basis of regulation and enforcement. (Paragraph 14)
2. We recommend that the Government uses the rules given to Ofcom under the 
Communications Act 2003 to set and enforce content standards for television and 
radio broadcasters, including rules relating to accuracy and impartiality, as a basis 
for setting standards for online content. We look forward to hearing Ofcom’s plans for 
greater regulation of social media this autumn. We plan to comment on these in our 
further Report. (Paragraph 15)
3. The Government should support research into the methods by which misinformation 
and disinformation are created and spread across the internet: a core part of this is fact-
checking. We recommend that the Government initiate a working group of experts to 
create a credible annotation of standards, so that people can see, at a glance, the level 
of verification of a site. This would help people to decide on the level of importance 
that they put on those sites. (Paragraph 18)
4. During the course of this inquiry we have wrestled with complex, global issues, which 
cannot easily be tackled by blunt, reactive and outmoded legislative instruments. 
In this Report, we suggest principle-based recommendations which are sufficiently 
adaptive to deal with fast-moving technological developments. We look forward to 
hearing the Government’s response to these recommendations. (Paragraph 19)
5. We also welcome submissions to the Committee from readers of this interim Report, 
based on these recommendations, and on specific areas where the recommendations 
can incorporate work already undertaken by others. This inquiry has grown 
through collaboration with other countries, organisations, parliamentarians, and 
individuals, in this country and abroad, and we want this co-operation to continue. 
(Paragraph 20)
The definition, role and legal responsibilities of tech companies
6. The Data Protection Act 2018 gives greater protection to people’s data than did its 
predecessor, the 1998 Data Protection Act, and follows the law set out in the GDPR. 
However, when the UK leaves the EU, social media companies will be able to process 
personal data of people in the UK from bases in the US, without any coverage of data 
protection law. We urge the Government to clarify this loophole in a White Paper this 
Autumn. (Paragraph 30)
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7. We welcome the increased powers that the Information Commissioner has been given 
as a result of the Data Protection Act 2018, and the ability to be able to look behind 
the curtain of tech companies, and to examine the data for themselves. However, to be 
a sheriff in the wild west of the internet, which is how the Information Commissioner 
has described her office, the ICO needs to have the same if not more technical expert 
knowledge as those organisations under scrutiny. The ICO needs to attract and employ 
more technically-skilled engineers who not only can analyse current technologies, 
but have the capacity to predict future technologies. We acknowledge the fact that 
the Government has given the ICO pay flexibility to retain and recruit more expert 
staff, but it is uncertain whether pay flexibility will be enough to retain and attract 
the expertise that the ICO needs. We recommend that the White Paper explores the 
possibility of major investment in the ICO and the way in which that money should be 
raised. One possible route could be a levy on tech companies operating in the UK, to 
help pay for the expanded work of the ICO, in a similar vein to the way in which the 
banking sector pays for the upkeep of the Financial Conduct Authority. (Paragraph 36)
8. The globalised nature of social media creates challenges for regulators. In evidence 
Facebook did not accept their responsibilities to identify or prevent illegal election 
campaign activity from overseas jurisdictions. In the context of outside interference in 
elections, this position is unsustainable and Facebook, and other platforms, must begin 
to take responsibility for the way in which their platforms are used. (Paragraph 44)
9. Electoral law in this country is not fit for purpose for the digital age, and needs to 
be amended to reflect new technologies. We support the Electoral Commission’s 
suggestion that all electronic campaigning should have easily accessible digital imprint 
requirements, including information on the publishing organisation and who is legally 
responsible for the spending, so that it is obvious at a glance who has sponsored that 
campaigning material, thereby bringing all online advertisements and messages into 
line with physically published leaflets, circulars and advertisements. We note that a 
similar recommendation was made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
and urge the Government to study the practicalities of giving the Electoral Commission 
this power in its White Paper. (Paragraph 45)
10. As well as having digital imprints, the Government should consider the feasibility of 
clear, persistent banners on all paid-for political adverts and videos, indicating the 
source and making it easy for users to identify what is in the adverts, and who the 
advertiser is. (Paragraph 46)
11. The Electoral Commission’s current maximum fine limit of £20,000 should be 
changed to a larger fine based on a fixed percentage of turnover, such as has been 
granted recently to the Information Commissioner’s Office in the Data Protection Act 
2018. Furthermore, the Electoral Commission should have the ability to refer matters 
to the Crown Prosecution Service, before their investigations have been completed. 
(Paragraph 47)
12. Electoral law needs to be updated to reflect changes in campaigning techniques, and 
the move from physical leaflets and billboards to online, micro-targeted political 
campaigning, as well as the many digital subcategories covered by paid and organic 
campaigning. The Government must carry out a comprehensive review of the current 
rules and regulations surrounding political work during elections and referenda, 
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including: increasing the length of the regulated period; definitions of what constitutes 
political campaigning; absolute transparency of online political campaigning; a 
category introduced for digital spending on campaigns; reducing the time for spending 
returns to be sent to the Electoral Commission (the current time for large political 
organisations is six months); and increasing the fine for not complying with the 
electoral law. (Paragraph 48)
13. The Government should consider giving the Electoral Commission the power to 
compel organisations that it does not specifically regulate, including tech companies 
and individuals, to provide information relevant to their inquiries, subject to due 
process. (Paragraph 49)
14. The Electoral Commission should also establish a code for advertising through social 
media during election periods, giving consideration to whether such activity should 
be restricted during the regulated period, to political organisations or campaigns 
that have registered with the Commission. Both the Electoral Commission and the 
ICO should consider the ethics of Facebook or other relevant social media companies 
selling lookalike political audiences to advertisers during the regulated period, where 
they are using the data they hold on their customers to guess whether their political 
interests are similar to those profiles held in target audiences already collected by a 
political campaign. In particular, we would ask them to consider whether users of 
Facebook or other relevant social media companies should have the right to opt out 
from being included in such lookalike audiences. (Paragraph 50)
15. Within social media, there is little or no regulation. Hugely important and 
influential subjects that affect us—political opinions, mental health, advertising, 
data privacy—are being raised, directly or indirectly, in these tech spaces. People’s 
behaviour is being modified and changed as a result of social media companies. 
There is currently no sign of this stopping. (Paragraph 56)
16. Social media companies cannot hide behind the claim of being merely a ‘platform’, 
claiming that they are tech companies and have no role themselves in regulating 
the content of their sites. That is not the case; they continually change what is and is 
not seen on their sites, based on algorithms and human intervention. However, they 
are also significantly different from the traditional model of a ‘publisher’, which 
commissions, pays for, edits and takes responsibility for the content it disseminates. 
(Paragraph 57)
17. We recommend that a new category of tech company is formulated, which tightens tech 
companies’ liabilities, and which is not necessarily either a ‘platform’ or a ‘publisher’. 
We anticipate that the Government will put forward these proposals in its White 
Paper later this year and hope that sufficient time will be built in for our Committee 
to comment on new policies and possible legislation. (Paragraph 58)
18. We support the launch of the Government’s Cairncross Review, which has been 
charged with studying the role of the digital advertising supply chain, and whether 
its model incentivises the proliferation of inaccurate or misleading news. We propose 
that this Report is taken into account as a submission to the Cairncross Review. We 
recommend that the possibility of the Advertising Standards Agency regulating digital 
67 Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report 
advertising be considered as part of the Review. We ourselves plan to take evidence on 
this question this autumn, from the ASA themselves, and as part of wider discussions 
with DCMS and Ofcom. (Paragraph 59)
19. It is our recommendation that this process should establish clear legal liability for the 
tech companies to act against harmful and illegal content on their platforms. This 
should include both content that has been referred to them for takedown by their 
users, and other content that should have been easy for the tech companies to identify 
for themselves. In these cases, failure to act on behalf of the tech companies could 
leave them open to legal proceedings launched either by a public regulator, and/or by 
individuals or organisations who have suffered as a result of this content being freely 
disseminated on a social media platform. (Paragraph 60)
20. Tech companies are not passive platforms on which users input content; they reward 
what is most engaging, because engagement is part of their business model and their 
growth strategy. They have profited greatly by using this model. This manipulation of 
the sites by tech companies must be made more transparent. Facebook has all of the 
information. Those outside of the company have none of it, unless Facebook chooses 
to release it. Facebook was reluctant to share information with the Committee, which 
does not bode well for future transparency We ask, once more, for Mr Zuckerberg to 
come to the Committee to answer the many outstanding questions to which Facebook 
has not responded adequately, to date. (Paragraph 64)
21. Facebook and other social media companies should not be in a position of ‘marking 
their own homework’. As part of its White Paper this Autumn, the Government 
need to carry out proactive work to find practical solutions to issues surrounding 
transparency that will work for both users, the Government, and the tech companies. 
(Paragraph 65)
22. Facebook and other social media companies have a duty to publish and to follow 
transparent rules. The Defamation Act 2013 contains provisions stating that, if a user 
is defamed on social media, and the offending individual cannot be identified, the 
liability rests with the platform. We urge the Government to examine the effectiveness 
of these provisions, and to monitor tech companies to ensure they are complying with 
court orders in the UK and to provide details of the source of disputed content—
including advertisements—to ensure that they are operating in accordance with the 
law, or any future industry Codes of Ethics or Conduct. Tech companies also have a 
responsibility to ensure full disclosure of the source of any political advertising they 
carry. (Paragraph 66)
23. Just as the finances of companies are audited and scrutinised, the same type of auditing 
and scrutinising should be carried out on the non-financial aspects of technology 
companies, including their security mechanisms and algorithms, to ensure they are 
operating responsibly. The Government should provide the appropriate body with the 
power to audit these companies, including algorithmic auditing, and we reiterate the 
point that the ICO’s powers should be substantially strengthened in these respects. 
(Paragraph 72)
24. If companies like Facebook and Twitter fail to act against fake accounts, and properly 
account for the estimated total of fake accounts on their sites at any one time, this 
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could not only damage the user experience, but potentially defraud advertisers who 
could be buying target audiences on the basis that the user profiles are connected to 
real people. We ask the Competition and Markets Authority to consider conducting 
an audit of the operation of the advertising market on social media. (Paragraph 73)
25. Social media companies have a legal duty to inform users of their privacy rights. 
Companies give users the illusion of users having freedom over how they control their 
data, but they make it extremely difficult, in practice, for users to protect their data. 
Complicated and lengthy terms and conditions, small buttons to protect our data and 
large buttons to share our data mean that, although in principle we have the ability 
to practise our rights over our data—through for example the GDPR and the Data 
Protection Act—in practice it is made hard for us. (Paragraph 75)
26. The UK Government should consider establishing a digital Atlantic Charter as a new 
mechanism to reassure users that their digital rights are guaranteed. This innovation 
would demonstrate the UK’s commitment to protecting and supporting users, and 
establish a formal basis for collaboration with the US on this issue. The Charter 
would be voluntary, but would be underpinned by a framework setting out clearly the 
respective legal obligations in signatory countries. This would help ensure alignment, 
if not in law, then in what users can expect in terms of liability and protections. 
(Paragraph 76)
27. The United Nations has named Facebook as being responsible for inciting hatred 
against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Burma, through its ‘Free Basics’ service. 
It provides people free mobile phone access without data charges, but is also 
responsible for the spread disinformation and propaganda. The CTO of Facebook, 
Mike Schroepfer described the situation in Burma as “awful”, yet Facebook cannot 
show us that it has done anything to stop the spread of disinformation against the 
Rohingya minority. (Paragraph 82)
28. The hate speech against the Rohingya—built up on Facebook, much of which is 
disseminated through fake accounts—and subsequent ethnic cleansing, has potentially 
resulted in the success of DFID’s aid programmes being greatly reduced, based on the 
qualifications they set for success. The activity of Facebook undermines international 
aid to Burma, including the UK Government’s work. Facebook is releasing a product 
that is dangerous to consumers and deeply unethical. We urge the Government to 
demonstrate how seriously it takes Facebook’s apparent collusion in spreading 
disinformation in Burma, at the earliest opportunity. This is a further example of 
Facebook failing to take responsibility for the misuse of its platform. (Paragraph 83)
29. A professional global Code of Ethics should be developed by tech companies, in 
collaboration with this and other governments, academics, and interested parties, 
including the World Summit on Information Society, to set down in writing what 
is and what is not acceptable by users on social media, with possible liabilities for 
companies and for individuals working for those companies, including those technical 
engineers involved in creating the software for the companies. New products should be 
tested to ensure that products are fit-for-purpose and do not constitute dangers to the 
users, or to society. (Paragraph 89)
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30. The Code of Ethics should be the backbone of tech companies’ work, and should 
be continually referred to when developing new technologies and algorithms. If 
companies fail to adhere to their own Code of Ethics, the UK Government should 
introduce regulation to make such ethical rules compulsory. (Paragraph 90)
31. The dominance of a handful of powerful tech companies, such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Google, has resulted in their behaving as if they were monopolies in their specific 
area. While this portrayal of tech companies does not appreciate the benefits of a 
shared service, where people can communicate freely, there are considerations around 
the data on which those services are based, and how these companies are using the 
vast amount of data they hold on users. In its White Paper, the Government must 
set out why the issue of monopolies is different in the tech world, and the measures 
needed to protect users’ data. (Paragraph 91)
The issue of data targeting, based around the Facebook, GSR and 
Cambridge Analytica allegations
32. Over the past month, Facebook has been investing in adverts globally, proclaiming the 
fact that “Fake accounts are not our friends.” Yet the serious failings in the company’s 
operations that resulted in data manipulation, resulting in misinformation and 
disinformation, have occurred again. Over four months after Facebook suspended 
Cambridge Analytica for its alleged data harvesting, Facebook suspended another 
company, Crimson Hexagon—which has direct contracts with the US government 
and Kremlin-connected Russian organisations—for allegedly carrying out the same 
offence. (Paragraph 133)
33. We are concerned about the administrators’ proposals in connection with SCL 
Elections Ltd, as listed in Companies House, and the fact that Emerdata Ltd is listed 
as the ultimate parent company of SCL Elections Ltd, and is the major creditor and 
owed over £6.3 million. The proposals also describe laptops from the SCL Elections 
Ltd offices being stolen, and laptops returned by the ICO, following its investigations, 
also being stolen. We recommend that the National Crime Agency, if it is not already, 
should investigate the connections between the company SCL Elections Ltd and 
Emerdata Ltd. (Paragraph 134)
34. The allegations of data harvesting revealed the extent of data misuse, made 
possible by Cambridge University’s Dr Kogan and facilitated by Facebook, GSR, 
and manipulated into micro-targeting Cambridge Analytica and its associated 
companies, through AIQ. The SCL Group and associated companies have gone into 
administration, but other companies are carrying out very similar work. Many of 
the individuals involved in SCL and Cambridge Analytica appear to have moved 
on to new corporate vehicles. Cambridge Analytica is currently being investigated 
by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) (and, as a leading academic 
institution, Cambridge University also has questions to answer from this affair 
about the activities of Dr Kogan). (Paragraph 135)
35. We invited Alexander Nix twice to give evidence; both times he was evasive in his 
answers and the standard of his answers fell well below those expected from a CEO 
of an organisation. His initial evidence concerning GSR was not the whole truth. 
There is a public interest in getting to the heart of what happened, and Alexander 
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Nix must take responsibility for failing to provide the full picture of events, for 
whatever reason. With respect to GSR, he misled us. We will give a final verdict on 
Mr Nix’s evidence when we complete the inquiry. (Paragraph 136)
Political campaigning
36. We recommend that the Government look at ways in which the UK law defines digital 
campaigning. This should include online adverts that use political terminology that 
are not sponsored by a specific political party. There should be a public register for 
political advertising, requiring all political advertising work to be listed for public 
display so that, even if work is not requiring regulation, it is accountable, clear, and 
transparent for all to see. There should be a ban on micro-targeted political advertising 
to lookalikes online, and a minimum limit for the number of voters sent individual 
political messages should be agreed, at a national level. (Paragraph 142)
37. We reiterate our support for the Cairncross Review and will engage with the 
consultation in the coming months. In particular, we hope that Frances Cairncross will 
give due weight to the role of digital advertising in elections, and will make concrete 
recommendations about how clearer rules can be introduced to ensure fairness and 
transparency. (Paragraph 143)
38. The Government should investigate ways in which to enforce transparency requirements 
on tech companies, to ensure that paid-for political advertising data on social media 
platforms, particularly in relation to political adverts, are publicly accessible, are 
clear and easily searchable, and identify the source, explaining who uploaded it, who 
sponsored it, and its country of origin. This information should be imprinted into the 
content, or included in a banner at the top of the content. Such transparency would 
also enable members of the public to understand the behaviour and intent of the 
content providers, and it would also enable interested academics and organisations to 
conduct analyses and to highlight trends. (Paragraph 144)
39. Tech companies must also address the issue of shell corporations and other professional 
attempts to hide identity in advert purchasing, especially around election advertising. 
There should be full disclosure of targeting used as part of advert transparency. The 
Government should explore ways of regulating on the use of external targeting on 
social media platforms, such as Facebook’s Custom Audiences. We expect to see the 
detail of how this will be achieved in its White Paper later this year. (Paragraph 145)
40. Data sets allegedly enabled Leave.EU to push their message to groups of people that 
they might not otherwise have had information about. This evidence informed our 
inquiry, backing up concerns that data is being harvested and utilised from many 
people unwittingly and used for purposes of which they may not be aware. It is 
alleged that Leave.EU obtained data used during the Referendum from insurance 
data from companies owned by Arron Banks. The Information Commissioner’s 
Office is investigating both the alleged misuse of customer data from Arron Banks’ 
Eldon Insurance Services Ltd and the misuse of that data by the call centre staff, to 
make calls on behalf of Leave.EU. These are extremely serious allegations. We look 
forward to hearing the final results of the ICO’s investigations, when it reports in 
October 2018. (Paragraph 159)
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Russian influence in political campaigns
41. In November 2017, the Prime Minister accused Russia of meddling in elections and 
planting ‘ fake news’ in an attempt to ‘weaponise information’ and sow discord in 
the West. It is clear from comments made by the then Secretary of State in evidence 
to us that he shares her concerns. However, there is a disconnect between the 
Government’s expressed concerns about foreign interference in elections, and tech 
companies intractability in recognising the issue. We would anticipate that this issue 
will be addressed, with possible plans of action, in the White Paper this Autumn. 
(Paragraph 176)
42. Arron Banks is, reportedly, the largest individual donor in UK political history. As 
far as we understand, he met with the Russian Ambassador, for the first time, in the 
run up to the EU Referendum. Evidence discloses that he discussed business ventures 
within Russia and beyond, and other financial ventures, in a series of meetings with 
Russian Embassy staff. Arron Banks and Andy Wigmore have misled the Committee 
on the number of meetings that took place with the Russian Embassy and walked out 
of the Committee’s evidence session to avoid scrutiny of the content of the discussions 
with the Russian Embassy. (Paragraph 185)
43. From the emails that we have seen, it is evident that Arron Banks had many meetings 
with Russian officials, including the Russian Ambassador, Alexander Yakovenko, 
between 2015 and 2017. The meetings involved discussions about business deals 
involving Alrosa, the Russian diamond monopoly, the purchase of gold mines, funded 
by Sberbank, the Russian-state bank, and the transferring of confidential documents 
to Russian officials. Mr. Banks seemed to want to hide the extent of his contacts with 
Russia, while his spokesman Andy Wigmore’s statements have been unreliable—by his 
own admission—and cannot be taken at face value. Mr Wigmore is a self-confessed 
liar and, as a result, little significance can be attached to anything that he says. It 
is unclear whether Mr. Banks profited from business deals arising from meetings 
arranged by Russian officials. We understand that the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
is investigating these matters. We believe that they should be given full access to any 
relevant information that will aid their inquiry. (Paragraph 186)
44. Arron Banks is believed to have donated £8.4 million to the Leave campaign, the 
largest political donation in British politics, but it is unclear from where he obtained 
that amount of money. He failed to satisfy us that his own donations had, in fact, 
come from sources within the UK. At the same time, we have evidence of Mr. Banks’ 
discussions with Russian Embassy contacts, including the Russian Ambassador, over 
potential gold and diamond deals, and the passing of confidential information by 
Mr Banks. The Electoral Commission should pursue investigations into donations 
that Arron Banks made to the Leave campaign, to verify that the money was not 
sourced from abroad. Should there be any doubt, the matter should be referred to 
the NCA. The Electoral Commission should come forward with proposals for more 
stringent requirements for major donors to demonstrate the source of their donations. 
(Paragraph 191)
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45. The Electoral Commission has recommended that there should be a change in the 
rules covering political spending, so that limits are put on the amount of money an 
individual can donate. We agree with this recommendation, and urge the Government 
to take this proposal on board. (Paragraph 192)
46. We heard evidence that showed alleged Russian interference in the Spanish 
Referendum, in October 2017. During the Referendum campaign, Russia provoked 
conflict, through a mixture of misleading information and disinformation, between 
people within Spain, and between Spain and other member states in the EU, and 
in NATO. We heard evidence that showed that Russia had a special interest in 
discrediting the Spanish democratic system, through Russian state affiliated TV 
organisations spreading propaganda that benefitted those wanting independence in 
Catalonia. (Paragraph 197)
47. We recommend that the UK Government approaches other governments and follows 
the recommendation agreed by US and EU representatives, including representatives 
from this Committee, at the recent inter-parliamentary meeting at the Atlantic 
Council. The Government should share information on risks, vulnerabilities, and best 
practices to counter Russian interference, and co-ordinate between parliamentarians 
across the world. Only by sharing information, resources, and best practice will this 
Government be able to combat Russian interference in our elections. We look forward 
to a White Paper this autumn, and the opportunity for the Government to set out 
the practical steps that it will follow to ensure greater global co-operation to combat 
Russian interference. (Paragraph 202)
48. Just as six Select Committees have joined forces in an attempt to combat Russian 
influence in our political discourse, so the Government should co-ordinate joint working 
with the different relevant Departments. Those Departments should not be working 
in silos, but should work together, sharing data, intelligence and expert knowledge, 
to counter the emerging threat of Russia, and other malign players. (Paragraph 203)
49. We note that the Mueller Inquiry into Russian interference in the United States is 
ongoing. It would be wrong for Robert Mueller’s investigation to take the lead about 
related issues in the UK. We recommend that the Government makes a statement about 
how many investigations are currently being carried out into Russian interference in 
UK politics and ensures that a co-ordinated structure exists, involving the Electoral 
Commission and the Information Commissioner, as well as other relevant authorities. 
(Paragraph 204)
SCL influence in foreign elections
50. We received disturbing evidence, some of which we have published, some of which we 
have not, of activities undertaken by the SCL-linked companies in various political 
campaigns dating from around 2010, including the use of hacking, of disinformation, 
and of voter suppression, and the use of the services of Black Cube, an Israeli private 
intelligence service, whose work allegedly included illegal hacking. We also heard of 
the links between SCL and Christian Kalin of Henley Partners and their involvement 
in election campaigns, in which Mr Kalin already ran or subsequently launched 
citizenship-by-investment programmes, involving the selling of countries passports to 
investors. SCL’s alleged undermining of democracies in many countries, by the active 
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manipulation of the facts and events, was happening alongside work done by the 
SCL Group on behalf of the UK Government, the US Government, and other allied 
governments. We do not have the remit or the capacity to investigate these claims 
ourselves, but we urge the Government to ensure that the National Crime Agency 
thoroughly investigates these allegations. (Paragraph 231)
Digital literacy
51. We recommend that the Government put forward proposals in its White Paper for an 
educational levy to be raised by social media companies, to finance a comprehensive 
educational framework (developed by charities and non-governmental organisations) 
and based online. Digital literacy should be the fourth pillar of education, alongside 
reading, writing and maths. The DCMS Department should co-ordinate with the 
Department for Education, in highlighting proposals to include digital literacy, as 
part of the Physical, Social, Health and Economic curriculum (PSHE). The social 
media educational levy should be used, in part, by the Government, to finance this 
additional part of the curriculum. (Paragraph 246)
52. There should be a unified public awareness initiative, supported by the Departments 
for DCMS, Health, and Education, with additional information and guidance from 
the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Electoral Commission, and funded in 
part by the tech company levy. Such an initiative would set the context of social media 
content, explain to people what their rights over their data are, within the context 
of current legislation, and set out ways in which people can interact with political 
campaigning on social media. This initiative should be a rolling programme, and not 
one that occurs only before general elections or referenda. (Paragraph 247)
53. The public should be made more aware of their ability to report digital campaigning 
that they think is misleading, or unlawful. We look forward to the work that the 
Electoral Commission is planning, to bring this to the fore. (Paragraph 248)
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Annex
Recommendations from the July 16 Inter-Parliamentary Meeting at 
the Atlantic Council
• Foreign interference in elections is an attack on citizens’ fundamental right to freely 
select their representatives and to determine the path forward for their countries.
• Democracies in the United States (US), Europe and elsewhere have experienced 
foreign interference in their elections through the spread of fake information, the 
amplification of divisive news, the leaking of sensitive information, the covert 
funding of candidates, and the targeting of voting systems.
• Governments, legislatures, social media companies, and civil society should raise 
public awareness of the challenge -- reaching out in a non-partisan fashion about the 
dangers of malicious foreign interference and ways to minimize the threat. Public 
resilience to malign foreign influence starts with clear communication. Further, 
governments should evaluate the appropriate role for government in educating the 
public about recognizing Russian and other propaganda.
• We urge the executive branches in the US, Canada, and European countries to 
develop whole-of government strategies to increase election security and combat 
electoral interference. Efforts in the US should focus on the mid-term and 2020 
elections. This should involve a collaborative, end-to-end evaluation of the security 
of election systems including federal, state, and local officials and election vendors; 
the development of a strong, coherent deterrence strategy to prevent an adversary 
from considering interfering; punitive options should that interference occur; 
and contingency plans for ensuring resiliency and bolstering public confidence in 
elections.
• As legislators, we welcome non-partisan legislative initiatives to build resilience of 
electoral systems and to counter foreign interference and urge that they be debated 
and voted on.
• Governments and legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic should allocate funds to 
counter election interference and disinformation. This should include empowering 
civil society groups to monitor and report foreign and malicious interference in 
elections.
• We encourage technology companies to cooperate with governments and civil society 
organizations to develop tools and procedures to fight interference, dramatically 
increase transparency, promote accountability, reduce vulnerabilities on social 
media platforms, including in relation to online political advertising, and raise public 
awareness about ways messages and news can be manipulated.
• We support greater and sustained Transatlantic cooperation, including between 
national governments, NATO, and the European Union, to share information on 
risks, vulnerabilities, and best practices to counter interference. Coordination 
between parliamentarians and open, regular dialogue with social media, technology 
companies, and civil society can strengthen these efforts.
• If Kremlin interference in upcoming elections continues, governments on both sides 
of the Atlantic should impose heavy costs, including sanctions, preferably coordinated 
between the US and Europe.
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Formal minutes
Tuesday 24 July 2018
Damian Collins, in the Chair
Julie Elliott Ian Lucas
Paul Farrelly Jo Stevens
Simon Hart Giles Watling
Julian Knight
Draft Report (Disinformation and ‘ fake news’: Interim Report), proposed by the Chairman, 
brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 248 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Annex agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No.134.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 5 September 2018 at 2.00 p.m.
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
Tuesday 19 Dec 2017
Samantha Bradshaw, Oxford Internet Institute, and Professor Kalina 
Bontcheva, Professor of Text Analysis, the University of Sheffield
Q1–51
David Alandete, Editor, El País, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, Director, Madrid 
Office, European Council on Foreign Relations, and Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, 
Senior Fellow for Russia and Euroasia at Elcano Royal Institute and Associate 
Professor, History of International Relations, Instituto de Empresa, Madrid Q52–85
Tuesday 16 January 2018
Bethan Crockett, Senior Director, Brand Safety and Digital Risk, GroupM 
EMEA, Eitan Jankelewitz, Partner, Sheridans, and Matt Rogerson, Head of 
Public Policy, Guardian News and Media
Q86–159
Tim Elkington, Chief Digital Officer, Internet Advertising Bureau, Phil Smith, 
Managing Director, Incorporated Society of British Advertisers, and Ben 
Williams, Adblock Plus Q160–188
Tuesday 23 January 2018
Professor Stephan Lewandowsky, University of Bristol; Professor Vian Bakir, 
Bangor University; and Dr Caroline Tagg, the Open University
Q189–237
Dr Charles Kriel, Corsham Institute; Adam Hildreth, CEO and Founder, Crisp; 
and Matt Breen, Commercial Director of Media Chain (part of the Social 
Chain Group) Q238–272
Thursday 8 February 2018
Juniper Downs, Global Head of Public Policy, YouTube; and Richard Gingras, 
Vice President of News, Google
Q273–342
Monika Bickert, Head of Global Policy Management, Facebook; and Simon 
Milner, Policy Director UK, Middle East and Africa, Facebook
Q343–478
Carlos Monje, Director, Public Policy and Philanthropy, US and Canada, 
Twitter; and Nick Pickles, Head of Public Policy and Philanthropy, UK, Twitter Q479–568
David Carroll, Associate Professor of Media Design, The New School; Amy 
Mitchell, Director of Journalism Research, Pew Research Centre; Frank Sesno, 
Director, School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University; 
and Claire Wardle, Research Fellow, Shorenstein Centre on Media, Politics 
and Public Policy
Q569–600
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David Chavern, President and CEO, News Media Alliance; Major Garrett, 
Chief White House Correspondent, CBS News; Tony Maddox, Executive 
VP and MD, CNN International; and Kinsey Wilson, Special Advisor to the 
President/CEO of the New York Times Q601–620
Tuesday 27 February 2018
Alexander Nix, Chief Executive, Cambridge Analytica Q621–848
Tuesday 6 March 2018
Bill Browder, founder and CEO, Hermitage Capital Management, and 
Edward Lucas, Senior Vice President, the Center for European Policy Analysis 
(CEPA) Q849–894
Elizabeth Denham, Commissioner, Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
Q895–942
Wednesday 14 March 2018
Rt Hon Matt Hancock, Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport Q943–1186
Wednesday 21 March 2018
Sandy Parakilas, former Facebook operations manager Q1187–1270
Tuesday 27 March 2018
Paul-Olivier Dehaye and Christopher Wylie Q1270–1461
Tuesday 17 April 2018
Brittany Kaiser, former Director of Program Development, Cambridge 
Analytica Q1462–1769
Tuesday 24 Apr 2018
Dr Aleksandr Kogan, Senior Research Associate, Department of Psychology, 
Cambridge University Q1769–2086
Thursday 26 April 2018
Mike Schroepfer, Chief Technical Officer, Facebook Q2087–2500
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Wednesday 2 May 2018
Chris Vickery, Director, Cyber Risk Research, UpGuard Q2501–2616
Tuesday 15 May 2018
Claire Bassett, Chief Executive, Electoral Commission, Louise Edwards, Head 
of Regulations, Electoral Commission, and Bob Posner, Director of Political 
Finance and Regulation and Legal Counsel, Electoral Commission Q2617–2760
Wednesday 16 May 2018
Jeff Silvester, Chief Operating Officer, AggregateIQ Q2761–3145
Tuesday 22 May 2018
Tristan Harris, Co-founder and Executive Director, Center for Humane 
Technology Q3146–3190
Wednesday 6 June 2018
Alexander Nix, former CEO, Cambridge Analytica Q3191–3480
Tuesday 12 June 2018
Arron Banks, co-founder of Leave.EU, and Andy Wigmore, Director of 
Communications, Leave.EU Q3481–3780
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Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
FNW and FKN numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not 
be complete.
Fake News (Former inquiry)
Written evidence received and published in April 2017 before inquiry was relaunched after 
election:
1 Bangor University, Network for Media & Persuasive Communication (FNW0054)
2 BBC (FNW0114)
3 Ben Nimmo (FNW0125)
4 Bob Goodall (FNW0078)
5 British Law Education and Technology Association (FNW0074)
6 Campaign for Responsible Financial Journalism (FNW0080)
7 Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power at King’s College London 
(FNW0089)
8 Committee on Standards in Public Life (FNW0049)
9 Darren Parmenter (FNW0016)
10 Dr Alexander Douglas and Professor Katherine Hawley (FNW0072)
11 Dr Ansgar Koene (FNW0116)
12 Dr David Manning (FNW0064)
13 Dr David Miller and others (FNW0094)
14 Dr Dominic Thorrington (FNW0010)
15 Dr Karol Lasok (FNW0021)
16 Dr Lucas Black (FNW0031)
17 Dr Michael Holland (FNW0104)
18 Dr Sandra Leaton Gray and Professor Andy Phippen (FNW0029)
19 Dr David Coast, Prof. Jo Fox, Prof. David Welch (FNW0085)
20 Edmund Wisty (FNW0056)
21 Electoral Commission (FNW0048)
22 Facebook (FNW0121)
23 Full Fact (FNW0097)
24 Google (FNW0123)
25 Guardian News & Media (FNW0096)
26 Himsworths Legal Limited (FNW0046)
27 Home Marketing Limited (FNW0059)
28 IMPRESS (FNW0112)
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29 InformAll and the CILIP Information Literacy Group (FNW0079)
30 Internet Advertising Bureau UK (FNW0081)
31 Internews (FNW0034)
32 Isabel Pakowski (FNW0076)
33 ITN (FNW0118)
34 ITV (FNW0115)
35 JAG Shaw Baker (FNW0090)
36 Kohei Watanabe (FNW0030)
37 Linda Greenwood (FNW0014)
38 Master Josh Traynor (FNW0068)
39 Members of the Centre for Politics & Media Research, Faculty for Media & 
Communication, Bournemouth University (FNW0083)
40 Michael Leidig (FNW0052)
41 Mr Gianfranco Polizzi (FNW0071)
42 Mr Jacob Rowbottom (FNW0070)
43 Mr Jane Winter (FNW0045)
44 Mr Mark Leiser (FNW0035)
45 Mr Vernon Moat (FNW0012)
46 Mr Xander Ward (FNW0037)
47 Ms Gemma MacNaught (FNW0102)
48 Muslim Council of Britain (FNW0120)
49 National Union of Journalists (FNW0053)
50 New Political Communication Unit - Royal Holloway, University of London 
(FNW0066)
51 Newgate Communications (FNW0073)
52 News Media Alliance (FNW0098)
53 News Media Association (FNW0087)
54 Ofcom (FNW0107)
55 politicaladvertising.co.uk (FNW0088)
56 Press Association (FNW0042)
57 Professor Brian Cathcart (FNW0050)
58 Professor Jim Ridgway (FNW0067)
59 Professor Julian Petley (FNW0099)
60 Professor Leighton Andrews (FNW0061)
61 Professor Stephan Lewandowsky, Professor James Ladyman, and Professor Jason 
Reifler (FNW0065)
62 Public Relations and Communications Association (FNW0077)
63 Research Libraries UK (FNW0062)
64 Simple Politics (FNW0024)
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65 Society of Editors (FNW0060)
66 Stephen Saunders (FNW0013)
67 Stop Funding Hate (FNW0091)
68 The Open University (FNW0092)
69 The Royal Statistical Society (FNW0084)
70 The Rt. Hon. the Lord David Blencathra (FNW0063)
71 Tobacco Control Research Group (FNW0075)
72 Transparify (FNW0040)
73 UCL Knowledge Lab (FNW0110)
74 University of Bristol (FNW0095)
75 University of Portsmouth, Alison Wakefield (FNW0103)
76 University of South Wales (FNW0086)
77 Voice of the Listener & Viewer (FNW0122)
78 WebRoots Democracy (FNW0124)
79 Wikimedia UK (FNW0058)
Fake News (Current inquiry)
Written evidence received in the relaunched inquiry:
1 Adblock Plus (FKN0046)
2 Age of Autism (FKN0010)
3 Age of Autism supplementary (FKN0027)
4 AggregateIQ (FKN0086)
5 Alexander Nix supplementary (FKN0072)
6 Amy Mitchell, Pew Research Centre (FKN0041)
7 Arron Banks (FKN0056)
8 Arron Banks supplementary (FKN0059)
9 Arron Banks further supplementary (FKN0080)
10 Association for Citizenship Teaching (FKN0012)
11 Avaaz (FKN0073)
12 Bangor University (FKN0003)
13 Borden Ladner Gervais LLP (FKN0089)
14 Brian Deer (FKN0019)
15 Brittany Kaiser (FKN0076)
16 Cambridge Analytica (FKN0045)
17 Chris Wylie supplementary (FKN0079)
18 Corsham Institute (FKN0007)
19 David Brear (FKN0065)
20 David Chavern, President and CEO, News Media Alliance (FKN0039)
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21 Disinformation Index (FKN0058)
22 Dr Aleksandr Kogan (FKN0077)
23 Dr Claire Wardle, Shorenstein Centre on Media, Politics and Public Policy (FKN0040)
24 Dr Emma Briant (FKN0071)
25 Dr Emma Briant, Senior Lecturer at University of Essex (FKN0092)
26 Dr Mils Hills (FKN0014)
27 Dr Paul Reilly (FKN0084)
28 Dr Sander van der Linden, et al (FKN0049)
29 Edmund Wisty (FKN0008)
30 Edward Lucas (FKN0052)
31 Electoral Commission (FKN0031)
32 Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner (FKN0051)
33 Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner supplementary (FKN0057)
34 Erin Anzelmo (FKN0074)
35 Facebook (FKN0048)
36 Facebook - Mike Schroepfer (FKN0082)
37 Facebook - Rebecca Stimson (FKN0095)
38 Facebook supplementary (FKN0078)
39 Factmata Limited, UK (FKN0035)
40 Google Supplementary (FKN0038)
41 Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice (FKN0005)
42 Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice (FKN0090)
43 HonestReporting (FKN0047)
44 Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (ISBA) supplementary (FKN0036)
45 Independent Press Standards Organisation (FKN0004)
46 Internet Advertising Bureau UK Supplementary (FKN0043)
47 IPA (FKN0093)
48 Isabella Weatherley (FKN0002)
49 Kalina Bontcheva supplementary (FKN0054)
50 M C McGrath (FKN0067)
51 Major Garrett, Chief Whitehouse Correspondent, CBS News (FKN0042)
52 MoneySavingExpert.com (FKN0068)
53 Mr Alistair McHugh (FKN0020)
54 Mr C Miller (FKN0009)
55 Mr Dominic Penna (FKN0021)
56 Mr Kevin Cahill (FKN0062)
57 Mr Kevin Cahill supplementary (FKN0063)
58 Mr Richard Ebley (FKN0015)
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59 Mr Samuel Townsend (FKN0018)
60 Ms Susie Alegre (FKN0081)
61 Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) (FKN0011)
62 National Literacy Trust (FKN0037)
63 Paul-Olivier Dehaye (FKN0055)
64 Professor Dr G. Keith Still (FKN0070)
65 Professor Leighton Andrews (FKN0006)
66 Professor Neville Morley (FKN0091)
67 Pupils 2 Parliament (FKN0025)
68 Ruchi Hajela (FKN0066)
69 Second Draft (FKN0050)
70 Stuart Mercer (FKN0016)
71 The Open University (FKN0026)
72 The Open University supplementary (FKN0044)
73 The Stonehenge Alliance (FKN0053)
74 University of Westminster - Communication and Media Research Institute & 
Westminster Institute for Advanced Studies (FKN0013)
75 W Morris (FKN0085)
Correspondence
Letter from Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, to the Chair 8 June 2018
Letter from the Chair to Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, 21 May 2018
Letter from Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, to the Chair, 14 May 2018
Annex to letter from Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, to the Chair, 14 May 2018: Letter from 
Gareth Lambe
Letter from the Chair to Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, 1 May 2018
Letter from the Chair to Alexander Nix, 28 March 2018
Letter from the Chair to Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, 28 March 2018
Letter from Rebecca Stimson, Facebook, to the Chair, 26 March 2018
Letter from the Chair to Alexander Nix, 22 March 2018
Letter from the Chair to Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook, 20 March 2018
Letter from Simon Milner, Facebook, to the Chair, 28 February 2018
Letter from the Chair to Jack Dorsey, Twitter, 25 January 2018
Letter from Nick Pickles, Twitter, to the Chair, 19 January 2018
Letter from Simon Milner, Facebook, to the Chair, 17 January 2018
Letter from the Chair to Jack Dorsey, Twitter, 14 December 2017
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Letter from Nick Pickles, Twitter, to the Chair, 13 December 2017
Letter from Nick Pickles, Twitter, to the Chair, 24 November 2017
Letter from Simon Milner, Facebook, to Chair, 21 November 2017
Letter from the Chair to Jack Dorsey, Twitter, re Russian-linked accounts, 3 November 2017
Letter from the Chair to Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook, re Russian-linked accounts, 19 October 
2017
Letter from the Chair to Dara Nasr, Twitter, 19 October 2017
Background papers
Background paper – Arron Banks, Andy Wigmore
Alexander Nix evidence – SCL & Cambridge Analytica Corporate Structure Development
Dr Emma Briant – Audio file links & transcripts, 4 June 2018
Chris Vickery - data flow illustration, 2 May 2018
Dr Aleksandr Kogan - PowerPoint slides, 24 April 2018
Brittany Kaiser – submitted emails
Brittany Kaiser – written statement
Brittany Kaiser – Background paper – Cambridge Analytica: Leave.EU: Psychographic 
Targeting for Britain
Britany Kaiser – Legal opinion on Cambridge Analytica and UKIP
Dr Emma Briant – Audio file links & transcripts
Dr Emma Briant – Explanatory essays giving context and analysis to submitted evidence
Matrix Chambers legal opinion: Referendum expenses 2016
Background papers submitted by Christopher Wylie
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